Uncommon Lokibot Injected Code Beacon via vbc.exe Network Connection (via network_connection)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
network_connection
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-07
Updated
2026-11-07

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the Visual Basic compiler vbc.exe initiating an outbound network connection, anomalous behavior for a local build tool and indicative of the Lokibot payload the .NET steganography loader injects into a newly spawned vbc.exe process. Adversaries leverage injection into vbc.exe to run malicious code and beacon under a trusted binary, making early detection critical for exposing the infection before credential exfiltration.

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Pivot detection · T1055 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.