VSS Backup Deletion via WMI - Powershell (via powershell)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Service
powershell
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-24
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects delete existing VSS backup via WMI.

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VSS Backup Deletion or Resize (via process_creation)
Malicious Boot Recovery Tampering via Bcdedit (via process_creation)
Malicious Inhibition of System Recovery via Shadow Copy or Backup Deletion (via process_creation)
Malicious Windows Native Backup Deletion (via process_creation)
DragonForce Ransomware Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via WMIC ShadowCopy Where Delete (via process_creation)
VSS Backup Deletion via WMI - Powershell (via powershell)
Pivot detection · T1490 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.