Windows DNS Queries Triggered by DesktopAppInstaller AppInstaller.EXE

ATT&CK techniques

C2

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
- T1105Ingress Tool Transfer
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies DNS queries initiated by AppInstaller.EXE, the default handler for the ms-appinstaller URI. Attackers can leverage AppInstaller to fetch and load packages from remote URLs, using DNS activity to resolve attacker-controlled domains. It relies on Windows DNS query telemetry and filters to events where the querying process path matches the DesktopAppInstaller AppInstaller.exe location.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1105 — drag to rearrange

Suspicious Remote Script Transfer via Bitsadmin (via process_creation)

Suspicious PowerShell Download Cradle via ClickFix Fake CAPTCHA (via process_creation)

Malicious Curl MSI Download to ProgramData via Process Creation

Suspicious CloudZ RAT Payload Download via curl to ProgramData

Suspicious Velociraptor Agent Deployment via msiexec From Cloud Storage

Suspicious PowerShell Download of lib.zip Archive

Suspicious File Download Via Bitsadmin Transfer

Suspicious PowerShell Download Of Text-Disguised Payload

Explorer WebDAV UNC Download Using At-Port Syntax

Windows DNS Queries Triggered by DesktopAppInstaller AppInstaller.EXE

Pivot detection · T1105 · 9 related

Changelog

v2

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-appinstaller-exe-dns-queries-during-ms-appinstaller-package-installation-7cff77e1

title: Windows DNS Queries Triggered by DesktopAppInstaller AppInstaller.EXE
id: f8c7c71f-5e44-4cff-9c1e-decdebab2982
related:
  - id: 180c7c5c-d64b-4a63-86e9-68910451bc8b
    type: derived
  - id: 7cff77e1-9663-46a3-8260-17f2e1aa9d0a
    type: derived
status: test
description: This rule identifies DNS queries initiated by AppInstaller.EXE, the default handler for the ms-appinstaller URI. Attackers can leverage AppInstaller to fetch and load packages from remote URLs, using DNS activity to resolve attacker-controlled domains. It relies on Windows DNS query telemetry and filters to events where the querying process path matches the DesktopAppInstaller AppInstaller.exe location.
references:
  - https://twitter.com/notwhickey/status/1333900137232523264
  - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/AppInstaller/
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/dns_query/dns_query_win_appinstaller.yml
author: frack113, Huntrule Team
date: 2021-11-24
modified: 2023-11-09
tags:
  - attack.command-and-control
  - attack.t1105
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: dns_query
detection:
  selection:
    Image|startswith: C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.DesktopAppInstaller_
    Image|endswith: \AppInstaller.exe
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1

Convert

This rule as a query you can run. Uses no unlock credit.

SplunkSPL