ArcSOC.exe Creates Suspicious Script/Executable Files on Windows
Alerts when ArcSOC.exe creates files with script/executable extensions such as .exe, .ps1, .aspx, or .bat.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- file_event
- Author
- Micah Babinski (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2025-11-25
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Initial Access → C2Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags Windows file creation events where ArcGIS Server’s ArcSOC.exe creates a file with an ending that matches common executable and script types. Attackers may use the web services process to drop payloads or stage persistence via unusual file creation. The detection relies on Windows file event telemetry that includes the creating process path (ending with \ArcSOC.exe) and the created file name suffix.
Reporting behind it
- reliaquest.comhttps://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-inside-flax-typhoons-arcgis-compromise/
- enterprise.arcgis.comhttps://enterprise.arcgis.com/en/server/12.0/administer/windows/inside-an-arcgis-server-site.htm
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_arcsoc_susp_file_created.yml
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: ArcSOC.exe Creates Suspicious Script/Executable Files on Windows
id: c272537b-5e41-4d81-9326-ecee505e549f
status: experimental
description: This rule flags Windows file creation events where ArcGIS Server’s ArcSOC.exe creates a file with an ending that matches common executable and script types. Attackers may use the web services process to drop payloads or stage persistence via unusual file creation. The detection relies on Windows file event telemetry that includes the creating process path (ending with \ArcSOC.exe) and the created file name suffix.
references:
- https://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-inside-flax-typhoons-arcgis-compromise/
- https://enterprise.arcgis.com/en/server/12.0/administer/windows/inside-an-arcgis-server-site.htm
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_arcsoc_susp_file_created.yml
author: Micah Babinski, Huntrule Team
date: 2025-11-25
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.persistence
- attack.initial-access
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1127
- attack.t1105
- attack.t1133
logsource:
category: file_event
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: \ArcSOC.exe
TargetFilename|endswith:
- .ahk
- .aspx
- .au3
- .bat
- .cmd
- .dll
- .exe
- .hta
- .js
- .ps1
- .py
- .vbe
- .vbs
- .wsf
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: e890acee-d488-420e-8f20-d9b19b3c3d43
type: derived