Windows CMSTP Process Spawning Child Process

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1218.003CMSTP
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags process creation events where the parent process is cmstp.exe, indicating Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer activity that can be leveraged for code execution. Attackers may abuse CMSTP to launch additional payloads via child processes, making parent-child process relationships an important telemetry signal. It relies on Windows process creation logs that include the parent image path.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1218.003 — drag to rearrange

CMSTP Execution of an INF Profile (via process_creation)

Suspicious CMSTP Execution With INF Payload via process_creation

CMSTP UAC Bypass via Automatic Install Flag (via process_creation)

Windows: cmstp.exe Loading DLL/OCX from Suspicious Paths

Windows Network Connection from Cmstp.EXE (Outbound)

Windows: Command-line execution of cmstp.exe with INF install/silent/autobind flags (UAC bypass pattern)

Windows CMSTP UAC Bypass Attempt via Autoelevate COM Object DllHost Execution

Windows Process Access to cmlua.dll by CMSTP Connection Manager Profile Installer

Windows Registry Events: CMSTP Execution via cmmgr32.exe TargetObject

Windows CMSTP Process Spawning Child Process

Pivot detection · T1218.003 · 9 related

Changelog

v2

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-cmstp-process-creation-spawning-child-processes-7d4cdc5a

title: Windows CMSTP Process Spawning Child Process
id: a621221b-4729-41be-8308-b9e68afec34a
status: stable
description: This rule flags process creation events where the parent process is cmstp.exe, indicating Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer activity that can be leveraged for code execution. Attackers may abuse CMSTP to launch additional payloads via child processes, making parent-child process relationships an important telemetry signal. It relies on Windows process creation logs that include the parent image path.
references:
  - https://web.archive.org/web/20190720093911/http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cmstp_execution_by_creation.yml
author: Nik Seetharaman, Huntrule Team
date: 2018-07-16
modified: 2020-12-23
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1218.003
  - attack.g0069
  - car.2019-04-001
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    ParentImage|endswith: \cmstp.exe
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate CMSTP use (unlikely in modern enterprise environments)
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 7d4cdc5a-0076-40ca-aac8-f7e714570e47
    type: derived

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