Windows Credential Manager Vault/File Access by Uncommon Application Images
Alerts on access to Windows credential/vault files by uncommon processes based on image path and file location.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- file_access
- Author
- Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2022-10-11
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Cred AccessRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags access to Windows credential-related storage locations, including the Microsoft Credentials and Vault directories, by processes whose image path is not under common system folders or Explorer. Such behavior can indicate credential theft attempts where an attacker targets stored credentials. It relies on file access telemetry that records the accessed path (FileName) and the accessing process image (Image), enabling filtering of typical system and Explorer activity.
Reporting behind it
- hunter2.gitbook.iohttps://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/privilege-escalation/mimikatz
- absolomb.comhttps://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_access/file_access_win_susp_credential_manager_access.yml
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows Credential Manager Vault/File Access by Uncommon Application Images
id: 71ed4328-452a-44a9-b838-cb8c38594a7f
status: test
description: This rule flags access to Windows credential-related storage locations, including the Microsoft Credentials and Vault directories, by processes whose image path is not under common system folders or Explorer. Such behavior can indicate credential theft attempts where an attacker targets stored credentials. It relies on file access telemetry that records the accessed path (FileName) and the accessing process image (Image), enabling filtering of typical system and Explorer activity.
references:
- https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/privilege-escalation/mimikatz
- https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_access/file_access_win_susp_credential_manager_access.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-10-11
modified: 2026-07-28
tags:
- attack.t1003
- attack.credential-access
logsource:
category: file_access
product: windows
definition: "Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File ETW provider"
detection:
selection:
FileName|contains:
- \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
- \AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
- \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Vault\
- \ProgramData\Microsoft\Vault\
filter_main_system_folders:
Image|startswith:
- C:\Program Files\
- C:\Program Files (x86)\
- C:\Windows\system32\
- C:\Windows\SysWOW64\
filter_main_explorer:
Image: C:\Windows\explorer.exe
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate software installed by the users for example in the "AppData" directory may access these files (for any reason).
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 407aecb1-e762-4acf-8c7b-d087bcff3bb6
type: derived