Windows CSExec Service File Creation (csexecsvc.exe)

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1569.002Service Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags file creation events where the target filename ends with \\csexecsvc.exe, indicating CSExec service installation prior to execution. Service-based execution can blend into legitimate Windows service workflows, making detection dependent on reliable file event telemetry. It relies on Windows file creation logs that capture the created target filename.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1569.002 — drag to rearrange

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Windows CSExec Service File Creation (csexecsvc.exe)

Pivot detection · T1569.002 · 9 related

Changelog

v2

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-csexec-service-file-creation-via-csexecsvc-exe-f0e2b768

title: Windows CSExec Service File Creation (csexecsvc.exe)
id: 40f3616a-1b3a-48d9-b6c7-4a82336a6690
status: test
description: This rule flags file creation events where the target filename ends with \\csexecsvc.exe, indicating CSExec service installation prior to execution. Service-based execution can blend into legitimate Windows service workflows, making detection dependent on reliable file event telemetry. It relies on Windows file creation logs that capture the created target filename.
references:
  - https://github.com/malcomvetter/CSExec
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_csexec_service.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2023-08-04
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1569.002
  - attack.s0029
logsource:
  category: file_event
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    TargetFilename|endswith: \csexecsvc.exe
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: f0e2b768-5220-47dd-b891-d57b96fc0ec1
    type: derived

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