Windows DCOM InternetExplorer.Application DLL Hijack via iertutil.dll Image Load

Alerts when iexplore.exe loads iertutil.dll from an Internet Explorer path, indicating possible DLL hijacking.

FreeReviewedSigma · Critical · v2

Product: windows
Category: image_load
Author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR), wagga (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2020-10-12
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Lateral Movement

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
- T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- T1021.003Distributed Component Object Model
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

Flags image load events where iexplore.exe loads iertutil.dll from an Internet Explorer path, indicative of a potential DLL hijack targeting the DCOM InternetExplorer.Application component. DLL hijacking matters because attackers can redirect a trusted process to load a malicious library for code execution. The rule relies on Windows image-load telemetry, specifically the loaded module path ending in iertutil.dll and the parent process image ending in iexplore.exe.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1021.002 — drag to rearrange

Windows DCOM InternetExplorer.Application iertutil.dll DLL Hijack Suspicion

Windows Security: Remote DCOM IE DLL Hijack via iertutil.dll in Internet Explorer path

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Suspicious Ransomware Fan-Out Deployment via PsExec Spread (Qilin)

Suspicious Impacket smbexec Command Execution Pattern

Malicious Impacket Wmiexec Remote Command Execution Pattern

Suspicious Remote Admin Share Execution via Conhost

Malicious Network Share Manipulation via Commandline (via process_creation)

Suspicious Number of Oustanding SMB Requests Increased (via process_creation)

Windows DCOM InternetExplorer.Application DLL Hijack via iertutil.dll Image Load

Pivot detection · T1021.002 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-dcom-internetexplorer-application-dll-hijack-via-iertutil-dll-image-load-f354eba5

title: Windows DCOM InternetExplorer.Application DLL Hijack via iertutil.dll Image Load
id: 61ebdf69-72d6-4872-8c34-06c708bf402a
related:
  - id: e554f142-5cf3-4e55-ace9-a1b59e0def65
    type: obsolete
  - id: 2f7979ae-f82b-45af-ac1d-2b10e93b0baa
    type: similar
  - id: f354eba5-623b-450f-b073-0b5b2773b6aa
    type: derived
status: test
description: Flags image load events where iexplore.exe loads iertutil.dll from an Internet Explorer path, indicative of a potential DLL hijack targeting the DCOM InternetExplorer.Application component. DLL hijacking matters because attackers can redirect a trusted process to load a malicious library for code execution. The rule relies on Windows image-load telemetry, specifically the loaded module path ending in iertutil.dll and the parent process image ending in iexplore.exe.
references:
  - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteDCOMIErtUtilDLLHijack/notebook.html
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_iexplore_dcom_iertutil_dll_hijack.yml
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR), wagga, Huntrule Team
date: 2020-10-12
modified: 2022-12-18
tags:
  - attack.lateral-movement
  - attack.t1021.002
  - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: image_load
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith: \Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe
    ImageLoaded|endswith: \Internet Explorer\iertutil.dll
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: critical
license: DRL-1.1

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