Windows Process Creation: CoercedPotato.exe Execution via ExploitId Parameters

Flags Windows process creation for CoercedPotato.exe with --exploitId and known IMPHASH values.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v2

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2023-10-11
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
- T1055Process Injection
Defense Evasion
- T1055Process Injection
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies process creation events where a command line invokes CoercedPotato.exe with an "--exploitId" argument. CoercedPotato is used for privilege escalation, so attacker execution of it is a strong indicator of attempted elevation. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry including the executable image path, command-line arguments, and matching IMPHASH values.

Reporting behind it

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Windows Process Creation: CoercedPotato.exe Execution via ExploitId Parameters

Pivot detection · T1055 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-detect-coercedpotato-exe-privilege-escalation-execution-e8d34729

title: "Windows Process Creation: CoercedPotato.exe Execution via ExploitId Parameters"
id: 68ea78cb-c447-41bd-af54-dfe46c5c6536
status: test
description: This rule identifies process creation events where a command line invokes CoercedPotato.exe with an "--exploitId" argument. CoercedPotato is used for privilege escalation, so attacker execution of it is a strong indicator of attempted elevation. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry including the executable image path, command-line arguments, and matching IMPHASH values.
references:
  - https://github.com/hackvens/CoercedPotato
  - https://blog.hackvens.fr/articles/CoercedPotato.html
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_coercedpotato.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2023-10-11
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1055
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_loader_img:
    Image|endswith: \CoercedPotato.exe
  selection_params:
    CommandLine|contains: " --exploitId "
  selection_loader_imphash:
    Hashes|contains:
      - IMPHASH=A75D7669DB6B2E107A44C4057FF7F7D6
      - IMPHASH=F91624350E2C678C5DCBE5E1F24E22C9
      - IMPHASH=14C81850A079A87E83D50CA41C709A15
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: e8d34729-86a4-4140-adfd-0a29c2106307
    type: derived

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