Windows Event Log Detects Volume Shadow Copy Mounts (HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy, EventID 98)

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
- T1003.002Security Account Manager
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies attempts to mount a Volume Shadow Copy by matching Windows System events from the NTFS provider. The pattern looks specifically for device names containing HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy. Attackers may use Volume Shadow Copy mounting to access data from previous system states, making this telemetry useful for spotting potentially suspicious storage-based access.

Reporting behind it

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Malicious Credential Hive Copy from Volume Shadow Copy

Malicious Secretdump Password Dumping via SMB Admin Share (via security)

Malicious Registry Hive Dump of SAM and SYSTEM via Reg Save (via process_creation)

Suspicious SAM Registry Hive Dump to Windows Temp by BianLian

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Windows Event Log Detects Volume Shadow Copy Mounts (HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy, EventID 98)

Pivot detection · T1003.002 · 9 related

Changelog

v2

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-detect-volume-shadow-copy-vss-mount-via-ntfs-event-98-f512acbf

title: Windows Event Log Detects Volume Shadow Copy Mounts (HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy, EventID 98)
id: 0ba2750e-22a2-4d2d-9120-532a7ca218a2
status: test
description: This rule identifies attempts to mount a Volume Shadow Copy by matching Windows System events from the NTFS provider. The pattern looks specifically for device names containing HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy. Attackers may use Volume Shadow Copy mounting to access data from previous system states, making this telemetry useful for spotting potentially suspicious storage-based access.
references:
  - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-3---esentutlexe-sam-copy
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/microsoft_windows_ntfs/win_system_volume_shadow_copy_mount.yml
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR), Huntrule Team
date: 2020-10-20
modified: 2022-12-25
tags:
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1003.002
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: system
detection:
  selection:
    Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Ntfs
    EventID: 98
    DeviceName|contains: HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate use of volume shadow copy mounts (backups maybe).
level: low
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: f512acbf-e662-4903-843e-97ce4652b740
    type: derived

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