Windows Successful Local Kerberos Logon to Built-in Administrator (Possible Privilege Escalation)
Alert on successful local (127.0.0.1) Kerberos logons targeting the built-in Administrator SID for potential privilege escalation.
- Product
- windows
- Service
- security
- Author
- Elastic, @SBousseaden (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2022-04-27
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Priv Esc → Defense EvasionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags a suspicious Windows Security event indicating a successful logon (EventID 4624) using the Kerberos authentication package from localhost (127.0.0.1). It further narrows matches to cases targeting the built-in local Administrator account by checking the TargetUserSid ends with -500 for a local SID range. Such activity may reflect an attacker attempting to escalate privileges locally by relaying or manipulating Kerberos authentication flows. The detection relies on Windows Security Audit telemetry fields including LogonType, AuthenticationPackageName, IpAddress, and TargetUserSid, while excluding events with IpPort set to 0.
Reporting behind it
- twitter.comhttps://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1518976397364056071?s=12&t=qKO5eKHvWhAP19a50FTZ7g
- github.comhttps://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/5fe7833312031a4787e07893e27e4ea7a7665745/rules/_deprecated/privilege_escalation_krbrelayup_suspicious_logon.toml#L38
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/account_management/win_security_susp_privesc_kerberos_relay_over_ldap.yml
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows Successful Local Kerberos Logon to Built-in Administrator (Possible Privilege Escalation)
id: a6a8e6cb-a5ba-4ef2-8541-d371acfc602a
status: test
description: This rule flags a suspicious Windows Security event indicating a successful logon (EventID 4624) using the Kerberos authentication package from localhost (127.0.0.1). It further narrows matches to cases targeting the built-in local Administrator account by checking the TargetUserSid ends with -500 for a local SID range. Such activity may reflect an attacker attempting to escalate privileges locally by relaying or manipulating Kerberos authentication flows. The detection relies on Windows Security Audit telemetry fields including LogonType, AuthenticationPackageName, IpAddress, and TargetUserSid, while excluding events with IpPort set to 0.
references:
- https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1518976397364056071?s=12&t=qKO5eKHvWhAP19a50FTZ7g
- https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/5fe7833312031a4787e07893e27e4ea7a7665745/rules/_deprecated/privilege_escalation_krbrelayup_suspicious_logon.toml#L38
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/security/account_management/win_security_susp_privesc_kerberos_relay_over_ldap.yml
author: Elastic, @SBousseaden, Huntrule Team
date: 2022-04-27
modified: 2024-08-13
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1548
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4624
LogonType: 3
AuthenticationPackageName: Kerberos
IpAddress: 127.0.0.1
TargetUserSid|startswith: S-1-5-21-
TargetUserSid|endswith: "-500"
filter_main_ip_null:
IpPort: "0"
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 749c9f5e-b353-4b90-a9c1-05243357ca4b
type: derived