Windows Driver Load from Temporary Directory Paths

Detects Windows driver loads whose ImageLoaded path contains the temporary directory (\Temp\).

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v2
Product
windows
Category
driver_load
Author
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published
2017-02-12
Updated
2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule flags Windows driver loads where the loaded image path contains the temporary directory segment '\Temp\'. Loading a driver from a temp location is suspicious because it may indicate an attempt to stage or execute privileged code from a transient location. The detection relies on telemetry that records the driver image path for driver load events.

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Malicious svchost Service Creation for TinyTurla Persistence (via process_creation)
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Interactive Service Creation Executing cmd via sc.exe
Windows Driver Load from Temporary Directory Paths
Pivot detection · T1543.003 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
  1. v2
    Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
  2. v1
    No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.