Windows Driver Load from Temporary Directory Paths

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1543.003Windows Service
Priv Esc
- T1543.003Windows Service
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags Windows driver loads where the loaded image path contains the temporary directory segment '\Temp\'. Loading a driver from a temp location is suspicious because it may indicate an attempt to stage or execute privileged code from a transient location. The detection relies on telemetry that records the driver image path for driver load events.

Reporting behind it

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Windows Driver Load from Temporary Directory Paths

Pivot detection · T1543.003 · 9 related

Changelog

v2

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-driver-load-with-image-path-containing-temp-2c4523d5

title: Windows Driver Load from Temporary Directory Paths
id: 8a29a853-7104-4c26-a000-0e7451973447
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows driver loads where the loaded image path contains the temporary directory segment '\Temp\'. Loading a driver from a temp location is suspicious because it may indicate an attempt to stage or execute privileged code from a transient location. The detection relies on telemetry that records the driver image path for driver load events.
references:
  - Internal Research
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/driver_load/driver_load_win_susp_temp_use.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2017-02-12
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1543.003
logsource:
  category: driver_load
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    ImageLoaded|contains: \Temp\
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - There is a relevant set of false positives depending on applications in the environment
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 2c4523d5-d481-4ed0-8ec3-7fbf0cb41a75
    type: derived

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