Windows Process Creation: EDRSilencer Executed

ATT&CK techniques

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies execution of the EDRSilencer executable by matching the process image path ending with \EDRSilencer.exe, the original file name being EDRSilencer.exe, and the process description containing EDRSilencer. EDRSilencer is used to impair defensive visibility by leveraging Windows Filtering Platform to prevent EDR agents from reporting security events. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry fields for image path, original file name, and description.

Reporting behind it

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Windows Process Creation: EDRSilencer Executed

Pivot detection · T1685 · 9 related

Changelog

v2

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-edrsilencer-hacktool-execution-via-edrsilencer-exe-process-creation-eb2d07d4

title: "Windows Process Creation: EDRSilencer Executed"
id: bcb592f0-9c87-413b-955a-83287e7e9818
status: test
description: This rule identifies execution of the EDRSilencer executable by matching the process image path ending with \EDRSilencer.exe, the original file name being EDRSilencer.exe, and the process description containing EDRSilencer. EDRSilencer is used to impair defensive visibility by leveraging Windows Filtering Platform to prevent EDR agents from reporting security events. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry fields for image path, original file name, and description.
references:
  - https://github.com/netero1010/EDRSilencer
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_edrsilencer.yml
author: "@gott_cyber, Huntrule Team"
date: 2024-01-02
tags:
  - attack.defense-impairment
  - attack.t1685
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    - Image|endswith: \EDRSilencer.exe
    - OriginalFileName: EDRSilencer.exe
    - Description|contains: EDRSilencer
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Unlikely
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: eb2d07d4-49cb-4523-801a-da002df36602
    type: derived

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