Windows HackTool Certify Execution via Certify.exe and common AD abuse arguments

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
- T1649Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies executions of Certify.exe by matching PE metadata indicators and command-line substrings associated with common Active Directory certificate abuse workflows. Attackers can leverage Certify to enumerate certificate services, identify vulnerable configurations, and request or download certificates using specific parameters. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, including Image/OriginalFileName metadata and CommandLine content.

Reporting behind it

Related detections4 linkedT1649 — drag to rearrange

Suspicious LDAP Enumeration of Certificate Templates (via security)

Windows Certificate Export from Local Certificate Store (Event ID 1007)

Windows CAPI2 Event 70: Certificate Private Key Acquired

Windows Process Creation: Certipy Tool Execution Based on PE and CLI Parameters

Windows HackTool Certify Execution via Certify.exe and common AD abuse arguments

Pivot detection · T1649 · 4 related

Changelog

v2

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-execution-of-certify-exe-for-ad-certificate-abuse-attempts-762f2482

title: Windows HackTool Certify Execution via Certify.exe and common AD abuse arguments
id: 7a7a6284-027b-444c-aa56-b06972ce482c
status: test
description: This rule identifies executions of Certify.exe by matching PE metadata indicators and command-line substrings associated with common Active Directory certificate abuse workflows. Attackers can leverage Certify to enumerate certificate services, identify vulnerable configurations, and request or download certificates using specific parameters. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, including Image/OriginalFileName metadata and CommandLine content.
references:
  - https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_certify.yml
author: pH-T (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2023-04-17
modified: 2023-04-25
tags:
  - attack.discovery
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.t1649
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    - Image|endswith: \Certify.exe
    - OriginalFileName: Certify.exe
    - Description|contains: Certify
  selection_cli_commands:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - ".exe cas "
      - ".exe find "
      - ".exe pkiobjects "
      - ".exe request "
      - ".exe download "
  selection_cli_options:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - " /vulnerable"
      - " /template:"
      - " /altname:"
      - " /domain:"
      - " /path:"
      - " /ca:"
  condition: selection_img or all of selection_cli_*
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 762f2482-ff21-4970-8939-0aa317a886bb
    type: derived

Convert

This rule as a query you can run. Uses no unlock credit.

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