Windows: Detect UACMe (Akagi.exe) execution via PE metadata and image name

Flags Windows processes likely running UACMe (Akagi.exe/Akagi64.exe) using PE metadata and known IMPHASH indicators.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v2

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2021-08-30
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
- T1548.002Bypass User Account Control
Defense Evasion
- T1548.002Bypass User Account Control
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies execution of the UACMe tool by matching PE metadata values and original file names associated with Akagi.exe/Akagi64.exe, as well as image filename endings and known imphash substrings. Attackers may use UAC bypass tooling to escalate privileges on Windows systems. The detection relies on process creation telemetry including PE product/company/description/original filename fields, the executed image path or name, and Sysmon file hash information containing imphash values.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1548.002 — drag to rearrange

Malicious FodHelper UAC Bypass via ms-settings Shell Command Hijack (via registry_set)

Suspicious Banana RAT UAC Skip Environment Variable in PowerShell

Malicious UAC Bypass via sdclt Handler Hijack (via registry_set)

Malicious UAC Bypass via ms-settings Handler Hijack (via registry_set)

Malicious DBatLoader DLL Sideloading via easinvoker.exe Loading netutils.dll (via image_load)

Suspicious dllhost.exe Spawned with CLSID and Anomalous Parent (via process_creation)

Malicious ms-settings DelegateExecute UAC Bypass Registry Change

Malicious User Account Control Bypass via Auto-Elevating Binary Hijack (via process_creation)

Suspicious Mock Trusted Directory with Trailing Space (via process_creation)

Windows: Detect UACMe (Akagi.exe) execution via PE metadata and image name

Pivot detection · T1548.002 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-execution-of-uacme-akagi-exe-akagi64-exe-via-pe-metadata-indicators-d38d2fa4

title: "Windows: Detect UACMe (Akagi.exe) execution via PE metadata and image name"
id: b5e7d8d6-c363-4615-8a6b-451284b6649f
status: test
description: This rule identifies execution of the UACMe tool by matching PE metadata values and original file names associated with Akagi.exe/Akagi64.exe, as well as image filename endings and known imphash substrings. Attackers may use UAC bypass tooling to escalate privileges on Windows systems. The detection relies on process creation telemetry including PE product/company/description/original filename fields, the executed image path or name, and Sysmon file hash information containing imphash values.
references:
  - https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_uacme.yml
author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2021-08-30
modified: 2024-11-23
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.t1548.002
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_pe:
    - Product: UACMe
    - Company:
        - REvol Corp
        - APT 92
        - UG North
        - Hazardous Environments
        - CD Project Rekt
    - Description:
        - UACMe main module
        - Pentesting utility
    - OriginalFileName:
        - Akagi.exe
        - Akagi64.exe
  selection_img:
    Image|endswith:
      - \Akagi64.exe
      - \Akagi.exe
  selection_hashes_sysmon:
    Hashes|contains:
      - IMPHASH=767637C23BB42CD5D7397CF58B0BE688
      - IMPHASH=14C4E4C72BA075E9069EE67F39188AD8
      - IMPHASH=3C782813D4AFCE07BBFC5A9772ACDBDC
      - IMPHASH=7D010C6BB6A3726F327F7E239166D127
      - IMPHASH=89159BA4DD04E4CE5559F132A9964EB3
      - IMPHASH=6F33F4A5FC42B8CEC7314947BD13F30F
      - IMPHASH=5834ED4291BDEB928270428EBBAF7604
      - IMPHASH=5A8A8A43F25485E7EE1B201EDCBC7A38
      - IMPHASH=DC7D30B90B2D8ABF664FBED2B1B59894
      - IMPHASH=41923EA1F824FE63EA5BEB84DB7A3E74
      - IMPHASH=3DE09703C8E79ED2CA3F01074719906B
  condition: 1 of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: d38d2fa4-98e6-4a24-aff1-410b0c9ad177
    type: derived

Convert

This rule as a query you can run. Uses no unlock credit.

SplunkSPL