Windows explorer.exe spawned with /NOUACCHECK flag for UAC bypass behavior
Alerts on explorer.exe executions that include /NOUACCHECK, indicating potential bypass of UAC checks for child processes.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2022-02-23
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Priv Esc → Defense EvasionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
Identifies process creation events where explorer.exe is started with the /NOUACCHECK flag, which can allow child processes to run without UAC checks. Attackers may use this to bypass User Account Control protections during a staged execution via a newly spawned explorer instance. The rule relies on process creation telemetry including the image path and command-line arguments, and it excludes events where the parent command line matches a scheduled-task related svchost invocation.
Reporting behind it
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows explorer.exe spawned with /NOUACCHECK flag for UAC bypass behavior
id: 4b2692e9-0efa-4f6d-878d-fb2c6898c513
status: test
description: Identifies process creation events where explorer.exe is started with the /NOUACCHECK flag, which can allow child processes to run without UAC checks. Attackers may use this to bypass User Account Control protections during a staged execution via a newly spawned explorer instance. The rule relies on process creation telemetry including the image path and command-line arguments, and it excludes events where the parent command line matches a scheduled-task related svchost invocation.
references:
- https://twitter.com/ORCA6665/status/1496478087244095491
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_explorer_nouaccheck.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-02-23
modified: 2022-04-21
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.t1548.002
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: \explorer.exe
CommandLine|contains: /NOUACCHECK
filter_dc_logon:
- ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule
- ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Domain Controller User Logon
- Unknown how many legitimate software products use that method
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 534f2ef7-e8a2-4433-816d-c91bccde289b
type: derived