Windows Process Execution of EDR-Freeze Tool

Flags execution of EDR-Freeze on Windows using image-name and IMPhash matches associated with the tool.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v2
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published
2025-09-24
Updated
2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies execution of the EDR-Freeze hacktool by matching process image paths containing EDR-Freeze/EDRFreeze and ending in .exe, optionally further constrained by specific IMPHASH values. Attackers can use EDR-Freeze to interfere with security monitoring by exploiting Windows user-mode behaviors to momentarily suspend security-related processes. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry (process image path and, where available, an IMPHASH field) to confirm the binary being run.

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Windows Process Execution of EDR-Freeze Tool
Pivot detection · T1685 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
  1. v2
    Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
  2. v1
    No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.