Windows DLL Load Trusted Path Bypass via Spoofed Directory Paths with Extra Space

Flags Windows DLL loads from spoofed "C:\Windows \\System32"-style paths with an extra space to indicate trusted-path bypass attempts.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v2

Product: windows
Category: image_load
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2025-06-17
Updated: 2026-07-31

Analysis Detection

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1574.007Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable
Persistence
- T1574.007Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable
Priv Esc
- T1548.002Bypass User Account Control
- T1574.007Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable
Defense Evasion
- T1548.002Bypass User Account Control
- T1574.007Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags DLL image loads from Windows directory paths that include an extra space, matching strings like :\Windows \System32\ and :\Windows \SysWOW64\. Such spoofed paths can cause Windows trusted path checks to be bypassed, enabling DLL loading behavior that may run with higher integrity than intended. The detection relies on Windows image load telemetry that records the loaded image path.

Reporting behind it

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Windows DLL Load Trusted Path Bypass via Spoofed Directory Paths with Extra Space

Pivot detection · T1548.002 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-image-load-trusted-path-bypass-via-spoofed-system-directory-with-extra-s-0cbe38c0

title: Windows DLL Load Trusted Path Bypass via Spoofed Directory Paths with Extra Space
id: 37be217d-81d1-49c7-b0d0-662edf057034
related:
  - id: 4ac47ed3-44c2-4b1f-9d51-bf46e8914126
    type: similar
  - id: 0cbe38c0-270c-41d9-ab79-6e5a9a669290
    type: derived
status: experimental
description: This rule flags DLL image loads from Windows directory paths that include an extra space, matching strings like :\Windows \System32\ and :\Windows \SysWOW64\. Such spoofed paths can cause Windows trusted path checks to be bypassed, enabling DLL loading behavior that may run with higher integrity than intended. The detection relies on Windows image load telemetry that records the loaded image path.
references:
  - https://x.com/Wietze/status/1933495426952421843
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_win_trusted_path_bypass.yml
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2025-06-17
tags:
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.execution
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1574.007
  - attack.t1548.002
logsource:
  category: image_load
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    ImageLoaded|contains:
      - :\Windows \System32\
      - :\Windows \SysWOW64\
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Unlikely
level: high
license: DRL-1.1

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