Windows: ISATAP Router Address Set via Iphlpsvc Event ID 4100
Alerts on Windows events where an ISATAP router address is set via Microsoft-Windows-Iphlpsvc, excluding localhost/null values.
- Product
- windows
- Service
- system
- Author
- hamid (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2025-10-19
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Cred Access → ImpactRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
What it detects
This rule identifies a Windows host where an ISATAP router address is configured, using Microsoft-Windows-Iphlpsvc Event ID 4100. Setting an ISATAP router affects IPv6 name resolution and traffic flow, which can be leveraged by attackers to intercept or redirect communications. The rule relies on Windows System event telemetry from the Iphlpsvc provider and filters out localhost and null values to reduce noise.
Reporting behind it
- blackhillsinfosec.comhttps://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/mitm6-strikes-again-the-dark-side-of-ipv6/
- redfoxsec.comhttps://redfoxsec.com/blog/ipv6-dns-takeover/
- securityhq.comhttps://www.securityhq.com/blog/malicious-isatap-tunneling-unearthed-on-windows-server/
- medium.comhttps://medium.com/@ninnesoturan/detecting-ipv6-dns-takeover-a54a6a88be1f
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/microsoft_windows_Iphlpsvc/win_system_isatap_router_address_set.yml
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: "Windows: ISATAP Router Address Set via Iphlpsvc Event ID 4100"
id: 4048b244-5b46-4d7d-90c1-1da564212790
status: experimental
description: This rule identifies a Windows host where an ISATAP router address is configured, using Microsoft-Windows-Iphlpsvc Event ID 4100. Setting an ISATAP router affects IPv6 name resolution and traffic flow, which can be leveraged by attackers to intercept or redirect communications. The rule relies on Windows System event telemetry from the Iphlpsvc provider and filters out localhost and null values to reduce noise.
references:
- https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/mitm6-strikes-again-the-dark-side-of-ipv6/
- https://redfoxsec.com/blog/ipv6-dns-takeover/
- https://www.securityhq.com/blog/malicious-isatap-tunneling-unearthed-on-windows-server/
- https://medium.com/@ninnesoturan/detecting-ipv6-dns-takeover-a54a6a88be1f
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/builtin/system/microsoft_windows_Iphlpsvc/win_system_isatap_router_address_set.yml
author: hamid, Huntrule Team
date: 2025-10-19
tags:
- attack.impact
- attack.credential-access
- attack.collection
- attack.initial-access
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.execution
- attack.t1557
- attack.t1565.002
logsource:
product: windows
service: system
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4100
Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Iphlpsvc
filter_main_localhost:
IsatapRouter:
- 127.0.0.1
- ::1
filter_optional_null:
IsatapRouter: null
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate ISATAP router configuration in enterprise environments
- IPv6 transition projects and network infrastructure changes
- Network administrators configuring dual-stack networking
- Automatic ISATAP configuration in some Windows deployments
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: d22df9cd-2aee-4089-93c7-9dc4eae77f2c
type: derived