Windows Suspicious .library-ms File Creation by 7z.exe, winrar.exe, or explorer.exe

Alerts on .library-ms file creation triggered by 7z.exe, winrar.exe, or explorer.exe, which may indicate forced-authentication style exploitation.

FreeReviewedSigma · Medium · v5
Product
windows
Category
file_event
Author
Gene Kazimiarovich (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published
2025-04-20
Updated
2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule flags Windows file creation events for files ending in .library-ms when the creating process is 7z.exe, winrar.exe, or explorer.exe. Attackers may use .library-ms shortcuts to trigger forced authentication behavior during archive extraction, potentially leading to exposure of authentication material. It relies on Windows file event telemetry that includes the target filename and the process image that created it.

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Windows Suspicious .library-ms File Creation by 7z.exe, winrar.exe, or explorer.exe
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Changelog

v5
  1. v5
    Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
  2. v4
    Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
  3. v3
    Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
  4. v2
    Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
  5. v1
    No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.