Windows Masqueraded System Binaries Executed from Non-Default Paths (msdtc.exe, gpsvc.exe)
Alerts on msdtc.exe or gpsvc.exe launched from paths outside Windows System32/SysWOW64.
FreeUnreviewedSigmahighv1
windows-masqueraded-system-binaries-executed-from-non-default-paths-msdtc-exe-gp-3f7f5b0b
title: Windows Masqueraded System Binaries Executed from Non-Default Paths (msdtc.exe, gpsvc.exe)
id: ec044cc3-0698-47c6-b027-a764c7b4160a
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows process executions where the binary filename ends with msdtc.exe or gpsvc.exe, but the executable path does not begin with the default System32 or SysWOW64 directories. Masquerading legitimate-looking system binaries from non-standard locations is a common stealth tactic to evade casual inspection and some allowlists. The detection relies on process creation telemetry, matching executable path patterns via the Image field.
references:
- https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180244/Lazarus_Under_The_Hood_PDF_final.pdf
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2017/TA/Lazarus/proc_creation_win_apt_lazarus_binary_masquerading.yml
author: Trent Liffick (@tliffick), Bartlomiej Czyz (@bczyz1), Huntrule Team
date: 2020-06-03
modified: 2023-03-10
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1036.005
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- \msdtc.exe
- \gpsvc.exe
filter:
Image|startswith:
- C:\Windows\System32\
- C:\Windows\SysWOW64\
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 3f7f5b0b-5b16-476c-a85f-ab477f6dd24b
type: derived
What it detects
This rule flags Windows process executions where the binary filename ends with msdtc.exe or gpsvc.exe, but the executable path does not begin with the default System32 or SysWOW64 directories. Masquerading legitimate-looking system binaries from non-standard locations is a common stealth tactic to evade casual inspection and some allowlists. The detection relies on process creation telemetry, matching executable path patterns via the Image field.
Known false positives
- Unlikely
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.