Windows Process Masquerading: msdtc.exe and gpsvc.exe launched from Non-System Paths

Alerts on msdtc.exe or gpsvc.exe launched from paths outside Windows System32/SysWOW64.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v5

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: Trent Liffick (@tliffick), Bartlomiej Czyz (@bczyz1) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2020-06-03
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags process executions where the image path ends with msdtc.exe or gpsvc.exe, but the executable is not located under the default Windows System32 or SysWOW64 directories. Masquerading with legitimate-sounding system binary names can help attackers blend in and reduce suspicion during execution. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, specifically the executable image path and path prefix/suffix matching.

Reporting behind it

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Windows Process Masquerading: msdtc.exe and gpsvc.exe launched from Non-System Paths

Pivot detection · T1036.005 · 9 related

Changelog

v5
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v4
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v3
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-masqueraded-system-binaries-executed-from-non-default-paths-msdtc-exe-gp-3f7f5b0b

title: "Windows Process Masquerading: msdtc.exe and gpsvc.exe launched from Non-System Paths"
id: ec044cc3-0698-47c6-b027-a764c7b4160a
status: test
description: This rule flags process executions where the image path ends with msdtc.exe or gpsvc.exe, but the executable is not located under the default Windows System32 or SysWOW64 directories. Masquerading with legitimate-sounding system binary names can help attackers blend in and reduce suspicion during execution. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, specifically the executable image path and path prefix/suffix matching.
references:
  - https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180244/Lazarus_Under_The_Hood_PDF_final.pdf
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2017/TA/Lazarus/proc_creation_win_apt_lazarus_binary_masquerading.yml
author: Trent Liffick (@tliffick), Bartlomiej Czyz (@bczyz1), Huntrule Team
date: 2020-06-03
modified: 2023-03-10
tags:
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1036.005
  - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    Image|endswith:
      - \msdtc.exe
      - \gpsvc.exe
  filter:
    Image|startswith:
      - C:\Windows\System32\
      - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
  - Unlikely
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 3f7f5b0b-5b16-476c-a85f-ab477f6dd24b
    type: derived

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