Windows msiexec.exe Execution from Uncommon Directory

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags process creation events where msiexec.exe is executed from a directory other than the typical Windows locations. Attackers may masquerade or proxy trusted installer execution to blend into normal activity while running malicious payloads. Detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry fields for the executable path and the OriginalFileName.

Reporting behind it

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Windows msiexec.exe Execution from Uncommon Directory

Pivot detection · T1036.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-msiexec-exe-execution-from-uncommon-directory-e22a6eb2

title: Windows msiexec.exe Execution from Uncommon Directory
id: 4dde7b57-b4d4-46d8-a189-cb72134edfd6
status: test
description: This rule flags process creation events where msiexec.exe is executed from a directory other than the typical Windows locations. Attackers may masquerade or proxy trusted installer execution to blend into normal activity while running malicious payloads. Detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry fields for the executable path and the OriginalFileName.
references:
  - https://twitter.com/200_okay_/status/1194765831911215104
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_msiexec_masquerading.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2019-11-14
modified: 2023-02-21
tags:
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1036.005
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    - Image|endswith: \msiexec.exe
    - OriginalFileName: \msiexec.exe
  filter:
    Image|startswith:
      - C:\Windows\System32\
      - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\
      - C:\Windows\WinSxS\
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: e22a6eb2-f8a5-44b5-8b44-a2dbd47b1144
    type: derived

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