Windows Named Pipe Created for PowerShell PSHost Instance

Alerts on named pipe creation with a \PSHost prefix, indicating PowerShell host-related activity.

FreeReviewedSigma · Informational · v2

Product: windows
Category: pipe_created
Author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2019-09-12
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059.001PowerShell
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies the creation of a named pipe whose name starts with '\PSHost', indicating a PowerShell instance using a PSHost-based named pipe. Attackers may use PowerShell to execute commands, and named-pipe artifacts can provide a reliable host-level signal when process telemetry is limited. It relies on telemetry for named pipe creation events, such as Sysmon pipe-created logs.

Reporting behind it

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Windows Named Pipe Created for PowerShell PSHost Instance

Pivot detection · T1059.001 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-named-pipe-created-for-powershell-host-pshost-ac7102b4

title: Windows Named Pipe Created for PowerShell PSHost Instance
id: d0c8bc83-fee5-48bf-a749-3f0669dfb8e2
related:
  - id: 58cb02d5-78ce-4692-b3e1-dce850aae41a
    type: derived
  - id: ac7102b4-9e1e-4802-9b4f-17c5524c015c
    type: derived
status: test
description: This rule identifies the creation of a named pipe whose name starts with '\PSHost', indicating a PowerShell instance using a PSHost-based named pipe. Attackers may use PowerShell to execute commands, and named-pipe artifacts can provide a reliable host-level signal when process telemetry is limited. It relies on telemetry for named pipe creation events, such as Sysmon pipe-created logs.
references:
  - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190610-PwshAlternateHosts/notebook.html
  - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190410-LocalPwshExecution/notebook.html
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_powershell_execution_pipe.yml
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), Huntrule Team
date: 2019-09-12
modified: 2023-11-30
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.001
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: pipe_created
  definition: Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575
detection:
  selection:
    PipeName|startswith: \PSHost
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Likely
level: informational
license: DRL-1.1

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