Windows Named Pipe Creation Matching Cobalt Strike Malleable C2 Pipe Patterns
Alerts on Windows named pipe creation with PipeName patterns consistent with Cobalt Strike Malleable C2 behavior.
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windows-named-pipe-creation-matching-cobalt-strike-malleable-c2-pipe-patterns-0e7163d4
title: Windows Named Pipe Creation Matching Cobalt Strike Malleable C2 Pipe Patterns
id: bbbe646e-327b-4eb6-aea7-49df51ae042e
related:
- id: 85adeb13-4fc9-4e68-8a4a-c7cb2c336eb7
type: similar
- id: d5601f8c-b26f-4ab0-9035-69e11a8d4ad2
type: similar
- id: 0e7163d4-9e19-4fa7-9be6-000c61aad77a
type: derived
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows named pipe creation where the PipeName matches a set of regular expressions associated with Cobalt Strike Malleable C2 named pipe patterns. Attackers may use these pipes for stealthy inter-process or C2 communications over Windows IPC, blending into otherwise legitimate named pipe activity. The detection relies on telemetry that records named pipe creation events and the associated PipeName value (for example, via Sysmon named pipe event logs).
references:
- https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575
- https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/6c600e524045a6d49c35291a21e10752
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_hktl_cobaltstrike_re.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2021-07-30
modified: 2026-06-18
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1055
logsource:
product: windows
category: pipe_created
definition: Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can always use Cobalt Strike, but also you can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575
detection:
selection:
- PipeName|re: \\mojo\.5688\.8052\.(?:183894939787088877|35780273329370473)[0-9a-f]{2}
- PipeName|re: \\wkssvc_?[0-9a-f]{2}
- PipeName|re: \\ntsvcs[0-9a-f]{2}
- PipeName|re: \\DserNamePipe[0-9a-f]{2}
- PipeName|re: \\SearchTextHarvester[0-9a-f]{2}
- PipeName|re: \\mypipe-(?:f|h)[0-9a-f]{2}
- PipeName|re: \\windows\.update\.manager[0-9a-f]{2,3}
- PipeName|re: \\ntsvcs_[0-9a-f]{2}
- PipeName|re: \\scerpc_?[0-9a-f]{2}
- PipeName|re: \\PGMessagePipe[0-9a-f]{2}
- PipeName|re: \\MsFteWds[0-9a-f]{2}
- PipeName|re: \\f4c3[0-9a-f]{2}
- PipeName|re: \\fullduplex_[0-9a-f]{2}
- PipeName|re: \\msrpc_[0-9a-f]{4}
- PipeName|re: \\win\\msrpc_[0-9a-f]{2}
- PipeName|re: \\f53f[0-9a-f]{2}$
- PipeName|re: \\rpc_[0-9a-f]{2}
- PipeName|re: \\spoolss_[0-9a-f]{2}
- PipeName|re: \\Winsock2\\CatalogChangeListener-[0-9a-f]{3}-0,
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
license: DRL-1.1
What it detects
This rule flags Windows named pipe creation where the PipeName matches a set of regular expressions associated with Cobalt Strike Malleable C2 named pipe patterns. Attackers may use these pipes for stealthy inter-process or C2 communications over Windows IPC, blending into otherwise legitimate named pipe activity. The detection relies on telemetry that records named pipe creation events and the associated PipeName value (for example, via Sysmon named pipe event logs).
Known false positives
- Unknown
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.