Windows Named Pipe Creation Matching Cobalt Strike Malleable C2 Profile Patterns

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
- T1055Process Injection
Defense Evasion
- T1055Process Injection
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags creation of Windows named pipes whose PipeName matches a set of regex patterns associated with Cobalt Strike malleable C2 profile naming. Attackers may use named pipes to enable stealthy inter-process or network-like command and control over local or relayed channels. Detection relies on telemetry that records named pipe creation events and the full PipeName value, such as Sysmon named pipe event logging.

Reporting behind it

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Windows Named Pipe Creation Matching Cobalt Strike Malleable C2 Profile Patterns

Pivot detection · T1055 · 9 related

Changelog

v2

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-named-pipe-creation-matching-cobalt-strike-malleable-c2-pipe-patterns-0e7163d4

title: Windows Named Pipe Creation Matching Cobalt Strike Malleable C2 Profile Patterns
id: bbbe646e-327b-4eb6-aea7-49df51ae042e
related:
  - id: 85adeb13-4fc9-4e68-8a4a-c7cb2c336eb7
    type: similar
  - id: d5601f8c-b26f-4ab0-9035-69e11a8d4ad2
    type: similar
  - id: 0e7163d4-9e19-4fa7-9be6-000c61aad77a
    type: derived
status: test
description: This rule flags creation of Windows named pipes whose PipeName matches a set of regex patterns associated with Cobalt Strike malleable C2 profile naming. Attackers may use named pipes to enable stealthy inter-process or network-like command and control over local or relayed channels. Detection relies on telemetry that records named pipe creation events and the full PipeName value, such as Sysmon named pipe event logging.
references:
  - https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575
  - https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/6c600e524045a6d49c35291a21e10752
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_hktl_cobaltstrike_re.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2021-07-30
modified: 2026-06-18
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1055
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: pipe_created
  definition: Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can always use Cobalt Strike, but also you can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575
detection:
  selection:
    - PipeName|re: \\mojo\.5688\.8052\.(?:183894939787088877|35780273329370473)[0-9a-f]{2}
    - PipeName|re: \\wkssvc_?[0-9a-f]{2}
    - PipeName|re: \\ntsvcs[0-9a-f]{2}
    - PipeName|re: \\DserNamePipe[0-9a-f]{2}
    - PipeName|re: \\SearchTextHarvester[0-9a-f]{2}
    - PipeName|re: \\mypipe-(?:f|h)[0-9a-f]{2}
    - PipeName|re: \\windows\.update\.manager[0-9a-f]{2,3}
    - PipeName|re: \\ntsvcs_[0-9a-f]{2}
    - PipeName|re: \\scerpc_?[0-9a-f]{2}
    - PipeName|re: \\PGMessagePipe[0-9a-f]{2}
    - PipeName|re: \\MsFteWds[0-9a-f]{2}
    - PipeName|re: \\f4c3[0-9a-f]{2}
    - PipeName|re: \\fullduplex_[0-9a-f]{2}
    - PipeName|re: \\msrpc_[0-9a-f]{4}
    - PipeName|re: \\win\\msrpc_[0-9a-f]{2}
    - PipeName|re: \\f53f[0-9a-f]{2}$
    - PipeName|re: \\rpc_[0-9a-f]{2}
    - PipeName|re: \\spoolss_[0-9a-f]{2}
    - PipeName|re: \\Winsock2\\CatalogChangeListener-[0-9a-f]{3}-0,
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: critical
license: DRL-1.1

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