Windows Named Pipe Creation for PsExec Default Pipe

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1569.002Service Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of the PsExec default named pipe (\PSEXESVC) on Windows. Attackers may use PsExec-style execution mechanisms that rely on Windows named pipes for service communication and remote command execution. It relies on telemetry that records named pipe events, specifically Sysmon pipe creation events (Event ID 17/18).

Reporting behind it

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Windows Named Pipe Creation for PsExec Default Pipe

Pivot detection · T1569.002 · 9 related

Changelog

v5

v5
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v4
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v3
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-named-pipe-creation-psexec-default-pipe-psexesvc-f3f3a972

title: Windows Named Pipe Creation for PsExec Default Pipe
id: 8e96463b-3cb1-45cc-ae99-91dcc9082fbf
related:
  - id: 42c575ea-e41e-41f1-b248-8093c3e82a28
    type: derived
  - id: f3f3a972-f982-40ad-b63c-bca6afdfad7c
    type: derived
status: test
description: This rule detects creation of the PsExec default named pipe (\PSEXESVC) on Windows. Attackers may use PsExec-style execution mechanisms that rely on Windows named pipes for service communication and remote command execution. It relies on telemetry that records named pipe events, specifically Sysmon pipe creation events (Event ID 17/18).
references:
  - https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/ir_research.html
  - https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-threat-hunting/windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_sysinternals_psexec_default_pipe.yml
author: Thomas Patzke, Huntrule Team
date: 2017-06-12
modified: 2022-10-09
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1569.002
  - attack.s0029
  - detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
  category: pipe_created
  product: windows
  definition: Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575
detection:
  selection:
    PipeName: \PSEXESVC
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: low
license: DRL-1.1

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