Windows Named Pipe Creation Matching EfsPotato-Style \\pipe\\srvsvc

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
- T1055Process Injection
Defense Evasion
- T1055Process Injection
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags Windows named pipe creation events where the PipeName contains generic named-pipe paths (\\pipe\\) and the specific marker \\pipe\\srvsvc, while excluding certain context-share and other default pipe prefixes to reduce noise. Attack tools may use named pipes for stealthy local communication or to support privileged operations, making this pattern useful for spotting suspicious IPC setup. It relies on telemetry that records named pipe creation with a PipeName field (e.g., Sysmon named pipe events).

Reporting behind it

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Windows Named Pipe Creation Matching EfsPotato-Style \\pipe\\srvsvc

Pivot detection · T1055 · 9 related

Changelog

v2

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-named-pipe-creation-with-pipe-and-pipe-srvsvc-pattern-efspotato-637f689e

title: Windows Named Pipe Creation Matching EfsPotato-Style \\pipe\\srvsvc
id: 8b8342e1-2aa7-4fb8-8479-37dedc051df1
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows named pipe creation events where the PipeName contains generic named-pipe paths (\\pipe\\) and the specific marker \\pipe\\srvsvc, while excluding certain context-share and other default pipe prefixes to reduce noise. Attack tools may use named pipes for stealthy local communication or to support privileged operations, making this pattern useful for spotting suspicious IPC setup. It relies on telemetry that records named pipe creation with a PipeName field (e.g., Sysmon named pipe events).
references:
  - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1429530155291193354?s=20
  - https://github.com/zcgonvh/EfsPotato
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_hktl_efspotato.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2021-08-23
modified: 2023-12-21
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1055
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: pipe_created
  definition: Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575
detection:
  selection:
    PipeName|contains:
      - \pipe\
      - \pipe\srvsvc
  filter_optional_ctx:
    PipeName|contains: \CtxShare
  filter_optional_default:
    PipeName|startswith: \pipe\
  condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
  - \pipe\LOCAL\Monitorian
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 637f689e-b4a5-4a86-be0e-0100a0a33ba2
    type: derived

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