Windows Named Pipe Access to ADFS/WID Database by Uncommon Process

Alert on named pipe creation to the AD FS WID SQL query endpoint when initiated by uncommon processes.

FreeReviewedSigma · Medium · v2

Product: windows
Category: pipe_created
Author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2021-10-08
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Collection

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
- T1005Data from Local System
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags creation of a named pipe connection targeting the AD FS Windows Internal Database (WID) query pipe (\MICROSOFT##WID\tsql\query). Such access can be used to retrieve AD FS configuration data and related sensitive information that may support token-signing or authentication workflows. It relies on Windows telemetry from named pipe creation events and examines the creating process image to reduce matches from expected service binaries.

Reporting behind it

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Windows Named Pipe Access to ADFS/WID Database by Uncommon Process

Pivot detection · T1005 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-named-pipe-to-ad-fs-wid-sql-query-path-by-uncommon-process-1ea13e8c

title: Windows Named Pipe Access to ADFS/WID Database by Uncommon Process
id: 1bc49183-d440-4539-9fc5-68f28a922d76
status: test
description: This rule flags creation of a named pipe connection targeting the AD FS Windows Internal Database (WID) query pipe (\MICROSOFT##WID\tsql\query). Such access can be used to retrieve AD FS configuration data and related sensitive information that may support token-signing or authentication workflows. It relies on Windows telemetry from named pipe creation events and examines the creating process image to reduce matches from expected service binaries.
references:
  - https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/f99542b94afe0ad2f19a82cc08262e7ac8e1428e/Detections/SecurityEvent/ADFSDBNamedPipeConnection.yaml
  - https://o365blog.com/post/adfs/
  - https://github.com/Azure/SimuLand
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/pipe_created/pipe_created_adfs_namedpipe_connection_uncommon_tool.yml
author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Huntrule Team
date: 2021-10-08
modified: 2023-11-30
tags:
  - attack.collection
  - attack.t1005
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: pipe_created
  definition: Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575
detection:
  selection:
    PipeName: \MICROSOFT##WID\tsql\query
  filter_main_generic:
    Image|endswith:
      - :\Windows\System32\mmc.exe
      - :\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
      - :\Windows\System32\wsmprovhost.exe
      - :\Windows\SysWOW64\mmc.exe
      - :\Windows\SysWOW64\wsmprovhost.exe
      - :\Windows\WID\Binn\sqlwriter.exe
      - \AzureADConnect.exe
      - \Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.PshSurrogate.exe
      - \Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe
      - \Microsoft.Tri.Sensor.exe
      - \sqlservr.exe
      - \tssdis.exe
  condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 1ea13e8c-03ea-409b-877d-ce5c3d2c1cb3
    type: derived

Convert

This rule as a query you can run. Uses no unlock credit.

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