Windows network connection from process running in suspicious or uncommon file paths
Alerts on Windows network connections initiated by processes executing from suspicious or uncommon directories.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- network_connection
- Author
- Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2017-03-19
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
C2Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags Windows network connections where the initiating process is running from a suspicious or uncommon file system location (for example, recycle bin, temp directories, default/public user folders, and various Windows subpaths). Attackers frequently execute or stage payloads from such locations to evade normal allowlists and blend into transient or user-writable areas before command-and-control communication. It relies on telemetry indicating the network connection was initiated and the process image path, including substring matches against known suspicious directory patterns, while excluding several common destination host domains.
Reporting behind it
Changelog
v2- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows network connection from process running in suspicious or uncommon file paths
id: 8c4ee897-ea32-4d6e-b2ae-3168ddf83ac1
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type: derived
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows network connections where the initiating process is running from a suspicious or uncommon file system location (for example, recycle bin, temp directories, default/public user folders, and various Windows subpaths). Attackers frequently execute or stage payloads from such locations to evade normal allowlists and blend into transient or user-writable areas before command-and-control communication. It relies on telemetry indicating the network connection was initiated and the process image path, including substring matches against known suspicious directory patterns, while excluding several common destination host domains.
references:
- https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/17pSTDNpa0sf6pHeRhusvWG6rThciE8CsXTSlDUAZDyo
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/network_connection/net_connection_win_susp_initiated_uncommon_or_suspicious_locations.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2017-03-19
modified: 2026-03-29
tags:
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1105
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Initiated: "true"
Image|contains:
- :\$Recycle.bin
- :\Perflogs\
- :\Temp\
- :\Users\Default\
- :\Users\Public\
- :\Windows\Fonts\
- :\Windows\IME\
- :\Windows\System32\Tasks\
- :\Windows\Tasks\
- \config\systemprofile\
- \Contacts\
- \Favorites\
- \Favourites\
- \Music\
- \Pictures\
- \Videos\
- \Windows\addins\
filter_main_domains:
DestinationHostname|endswith:
- .githubusercontent.com
- 0x0.st
- anonfiles.com
- bashupload.com
- cdn.discordapp.com
- chunk.io
- ddns.net
- dl.dropboxusercontent.com
- ghostbin.co
- github.com
- glitch.me
- gofile.io
- hastebin.com
- mediafire.com
- mega.co.nz
- mega.nz
- onrender.com
- pages.dev
- paste.ee
- pastebin.com
- pastebin.pl
- pastetext.net
- portmap.io
- privatlab.com
- privatlab.net
- send.exploit.in
- sendspace.com
- storage.googleapis.com
- storjshare.io
- supabase.co
- temp.sh
- transfer.sh
- trycloudflare.com
- ufile.io
- w3spaces.com
- workers.dev
- x0.at
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1