Windows Dsacls.EXE Password Spraying Check via /user and /passwd

Flags dsacls.exe executions that specify both /user: and /passwd:, consistent with password spraying attempts.

FreeReviewedSigma · Medium · v2

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2022-06-20
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1218System Binary Proxy Execution
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

Identifies process executions of dsacls.exe where the command line includes both a target user (/user:) and a password value (/passwd:). This combination aligns with scripted attempts to probe directory authentication using multiple credentials, which can precede or enable password spraying. Telemetry required includes Windows process creation events with the executable path/name and full command-line arguments.

Reporting behind it

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Windows Dsacls.EXE Password Spraying Check via /user and /passwd

Pivot detection · T1218 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-password-spraying-attempt-via-dsacls-exe-bac9fb54

title: Windows Dsacls.EXE Password Spraying Check via /user and /passwd
id: 8781ffa2-9664-470e-a6b0-0972e52a6d58
status: test
description: Identifies process executions of dsacls.exe where the command line includes both a target user (/user:) and a password value (/passwd:). This combination aligns with scripted attempts to probe directory authentication using multiple credentials, which can precede or enable password spraying. Telemetry required includes Windows process creation events with the executable path/name and full command-line arguments.
references:
  - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/using-dsacls-to-check-ad-object-permissions#password-spraying-anyone
  - https://ss64.com/nt/dsacls.html
  - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc771151(v=ws.11)
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_dsacls_password_spray.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-06-20
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1218
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    - Image|endswith: \dsacls.exe
    - OriginalFileName: DSACLS.EXE
  selection_cli:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - "/user:"
      - "/passwd:"
  condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate use of dsacls to bind to an LDAP session
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: bac9fb54-2da7-44e9-988f-11e9a5edbc0c
    type: derived

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