Suspicious autorun registry modification via WMI wmic spawning reg.exe on Windows

Flags WMIC-driven reg.exe commands that add Run key autorun entries, especially when pointing to suspicious temp/user locations.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v2

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2025-02-17
Updated: 2026-07-31

Analysis Detection

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1047Windows Management Instrumentation
Persistence
- T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Priv Esc
- T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags process creation events where wmic.exe (parented by wmiprvse.exe) is used to invoke reg.exe to add an autorun entry under Windows Run keys in HKCU or related locations, consistent with persistence attempts. It further constrains matches to command lines referencing common suspicious file path patterns typical of dropped or temporary executables. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, including Image, ParentImage, OriginalFileName, and CommandLine.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1547.001 — drag to rearrange

Suspicious Autorun Registry Persistence via sausageLoop Run Key

Malicious BabyLockerKZ Run Key Persistence

Suspicious Run Key Persistence Pointing To User-Writable Path

Malicious Ctrlpanel Run Key Autostart Persistence (via registry_set)

Persistence Run Key Pointing to svchost.exe in AppData Roaming

Malicious UAT-8302 Remote Process Execution via wmic

Malicious Remote Encryptor Execution via WMIC Process Call Create (Chaos Ransomware)

Malicious Impacket Wmiexec Remote Command Execution Pattern

Malicious Shadow Copy Deletion Via WMI

Suspicious autorun registry modification via WMI wmic spawning reg.exe on Windows

Pivot detection · T1547.001 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-persistence-wmic-used-to-add-run-registry-values-via-reg-exe-c80e66d8

title: Suspicious autorun registry modification via WMI wmic spawning reg.exe on Windows
id: 174de910-e759-4513-a68c-5d73ce894596
status: experimental
description: This rule flags process creation events where wmic.exe (parented by wmiprvse.exe) is used to invoke reg.exe to add an autorun entry under Windows Run keys in HKCU or related locations, consistent with persistence attempts. It further constrains matches to command lines referencing common suspicious file path patterns typical of dropped or temporary executables. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry, including Image, ParentImage, OriginalFileName, and CommandLine.
references:
  - Internal Research
  - https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/blob/e4c7b21b8f36c97c35b7c622732b38a189ce18f7/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_autorun_registry_modified_via_wmic.yml
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2025-02-17
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.execution
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1547.001
  - attack.t1047
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_execution_img:
    - Image|endswith: \wmic.exe
    - OriginalFileName: wmic.exe
    - ParentImage|endswith: \wmiprvse.exe
  selection_execution_cmd:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - reg
      - " add "
    CommandLine|contains:
      - \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
      - \Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
      - \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run
  selection_suspicious_paths_1:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - :\Perflogs
      - :\ProgramData'
      - :\Windows\Temp
      - :\Temp
      - \AppData\Local\Temp
      - \AppData\Roaming
      - :\$Recycle.bin
      - :\Users\Default
      - :\Users\public
      - "%temp%"
      - "%tmp%"
      - "%Public%"
      - "%AppData%"
  selection_suspicious_paths_user_1:
    CommandLine|contains: :\Users\
  selection_suspicious_paths_user_2:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - \Favorites
      - \Favourites
      - \Contacts
      - \Music
      - \Pictures
      - \Documents
      - \Photos
  condition: all of selection_execution_* and (selection_suspicious_paths_1 or (all of selection_suspicious_paths_user_*))
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate administrative activity or software installations
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: c80e66d8-1780-48a9-b412-46663fd21ac0
    type: derived

Convert

This rule as a query you can run. Uses no unlock credit.

SplunkSPL