Suspicious WSMAN COM Provider Usage Without PowerShell Host (Windows)

Alerts on WSMAN COM provider activity where the host application is not PowerShell.exe in PowerShell Classic logs.

FreeReviewedSigma · Medium · v2

Product: windows
Service: powershell-classic
Author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2020-06-24
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Lateral Movement

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059.001PowerShell
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
- T1021.003Distributed Component Object Model
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule identifies events where the WSMAN COM provider is referenced via the Data field, but the host application is not PowerShell.exe (or common PowerShell.exe paths). Attackers may use WSMAN-related COM activity for execution or lateral movement while avoiding PowerShell as the visible host process. It relies on Windows PowerShell Classic telemetry capturing the relevant Data string, including ProviderName=WSMan and HostApplication values.

Reporting behind it

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Suspicious WSMAN COM Provider Usage Without PowerShell Host (Windows)

Pivot detection · T1059.001 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-powershell-classic-logs-suspicious-wsman-com-provider-use-without-powers-df9a0e0e

title: Suspicious WSMAN COM Provider Usage Without PowerShell Host (Windows)
id: af5ed5e6-8971-47fc-a3dc-c9e6b984df8f
status: test
description: This rule identifies events where the WSMAN COM provider is referenced via the Data field, but the host application is not PowerShell.exe (or common PowerShell.exe paths). Attackers may use WSMAN-related COM activity for execution or lateral movement while avoiding PowerShell as the visible host process. It relies on Windows PowerShell Classic telemetry capturing the relevant Data string, including ProviderName=WSMan and HostApplication values.
references:
  - https://twitter.com/chadtilbury/status/1275851297770610688
  - https://bohops.com/2020/05/12/ws-management-com-another-approach-for-winrm-lateral-movement/
  - https://github.com/bohops/WSMan-WinRM
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_classic/posh_pc_wsman_com_provider_no_powershell.yml
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), Huntrule Team
date: 2020-06-24
modified: 2025-10-22
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.001
  - attack.lateral-movement
  - attack.t1021.003
logsource:
  product: windows
  service: powershell-classic
detection:
  selection:
    Data|contains: ProviderName=WSMan
  filter_main_ps:
    Data|contains:
      - HostApplication=powershell
      - HostApplication=C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell
      - HostApplication=C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell
      - HostApplication=C:/Windows/System32/WindowsPowerShell/v1.0/powershell
      - HostApplication=C:/Windows/SysWOW64/WindowsPowerShell/v1.0/powershell
  filter_main_host_application_null:
    Data|re: HostId=[a-zA-Z0-9-]{36}\s+EngineVersion=
  filter_optional_hexnode:
    Data|contains: HostApplication=C:\Hexnode\Hexnode Agent\Current\HexnodeAgent.exe
  condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: df9a0e0e-fedb-4d6c-8668-d765dfc92aa7
    type: derived

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