Windows PowerShell Command Lines Containing [char]0x or (WCHAR)0x Obfuscation Syntax

Identifies PowerShell execution command lines using suspicious [char]0x or (WCHAR)0x encoding patterns.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published
2020-07-09
Updated
2026-07-30

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule flags Windows process creation events where a PowerShell command line contains encoded character syntax patterns such as "[char]0x" or "(WCHAR)0x". Attackers commonly use these representations to obscure payload content and reduce readability for analysts and simple string-based detections. Detection relies on process creation telemetry and matching these specific substrings in the command line.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.