Windows: New-ADServiceAccount Creates Delegated Service Account in Target OUs

Alerts on PowerShell runs of New-ADServiceAccount to create a delegated service account with -CreateDelegatedServiceAccount and -path.

FreeReviewedSigma · Medium · v2

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2025-05-24
Updated: 2026-07-31

Analysis Detection

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
- T1078.002Domain Accounts
Execution
Persistence
- T1078.002Domain Accounts
- T1098Account Manipulation
Priv Esc
- T1078.002Domain Accounts
- T1098Account Manipulation
Defense Evasion
- T1078.002Domain Accounts
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags PowerShell process activity where CommandLine contains New-ADServiceAccount alongside -CreateDelegatedServiceAccount and -path, indicating creation of a delegated service account and placement into a specified OU path. Attackers may use this to establish privileged directory-integrated persistence or to attempt privilege escalation by creating or manipulating service account objects in Active Directory. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry capturing the initiating shell (PowerShell variants) and the full command line arguments.

Reporting behind it

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Windows: New-ADServiceAccount Creates Delegated Service Account in Target OUs

Pivot detection · T1098 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-powershell-creates-delegated-service-account-new-adserviceaccount-in-tar-0ea8db81

title: "Windows: New-ADServiceAccount Creates Delegated Service Account in Target OUs"
id: f5edaed9-2a5a-4eff-9b74-49aca45b392f
related:
  - id: e15bc294-ae2a-45ad-b7d6-637b33868bde
    type: similar
  - id: 02122374-b74e-495c-b285-9e4da973f3d6
    type: similar
  - id: 0ea8db81-2ff6-4525-9448-33bbe7effc13
    type: derived
status: experimental
description: This rule flags PowerShell process activity where CommandLine contains New-ADServiceAccount alongside -CreateDelegatedServiceAccount and -path, indicating creation of a delegated service account and placement into a specified OU path. Attackers may use this to establish privileged directory-integrated persistence or to attempt privilege escalation by creating or manipulating service account objects in Active Directory. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry capturing the initiating shell (PowerShell variants) and the full command line arguments.
references:
  - https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/abusing-bad-successor-for-privilege-escalation-in-active-directory
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_create_new_dmsasvc_account.yml
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2025-05-24
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1078.002
  - attack.t1098
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_img:
    - Image|endswith:
        - \powershell.exe
        - \pwsh.exe
        - \powershell_ise.exe
    - OriginalFileName:
        - powershell.exe
        - pwsh.dll
        - powershell_ise.exe
  selection_cli:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - New-ADServiceAccount
      - -CreateDelegatedServiceAccount
      - -path
  condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1

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