Windows PowerShell: Suspicious GetTypeFromCLSID and ShellExecute usage

Flags PowerShell script blocks that use GetTypeFromCLSID followed by ShellExecute.

FreeReviewedSigma · Medium · v2

Product: windows
Category: ps_script
Author: frack113 (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2022-04-02
Updated: 2026-07-31

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1546.015Component Object Model Hijacking
Priv Esc
- T1546.015Component Object Model Hijacking
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags PowerShell script content that calls [System.Type]::GetTypeFromCLSID() and then invokes .ShellExecute(), a pattern commonly used to instantiate COM objects and execute actions from scripts. Attackers can use this technique to launch processes or trigger behaviors while leveraging COM activation and execution. The detection relies on script block text telemetry that captures the relevant code strings in logged PowerShell script content.

Reporting behind it

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Windows PowerShell: Suspicious GetTypeFromCLSID and ShellExecute usage

Pivot detection · T1546.015 · 9 related

Changelog

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-powershell-gettypefromclsid-shellexecute-usage-8bc063d5

title: "Windows PowerShell: Suspicious GetTypeFromCLSID and ShellExecute usage"
id: 78341c66-072a-4d96-8919-9618c181e3dd
status: test
description: This rule flags PowerShell script content that calls [System.Type]::GetTypeFromCLSID() and then invokes .ShellExecute(), a pattern commonly used to instantiate COM objects and execute actions from scripts. Attackers can use this technique to launch processes or trigger behaviors while leveraging COM activation and execution. The detection relies on script block text telemetry that captures the relevant code strings in logged PowerShell script content.
references:
  - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.015/T1546.015.md#atomic-test-2---powershell-execute-com-object
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/powershell/powershell_script/posh_ps_susp_gettypefromclsid.yml
author: frack113, Huntrule Team
date: 2022-04-02
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.t1546.015
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: ps_script
  definition: "Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled"
detection:
  selection:
    ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
      - ::GetTypeFromCLSID(
      - .ShellExecute(
  condition: selection
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate PowerShell scripts
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 8bc063d5-3a3a-4f01-a140-bc15e55e8437
    type: derived

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