Windows Prefetch File Deletion via .pf File Removal

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1070.004File Deletion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

Identifies attempts to delete Windows Prefetch files by matching target paths under :\Windows\Prefetch\ and filenames ending in .pf. Attackers may remove these artifacts to hinder forensic reconstruction of recently executed processes. The detection relies on Windows file deletion telemetry that includes the deleted target filename, and optionally filters out svchost activity associated with common prefetch housekeeping patterns.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1070.004 — drag to rearrange

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Suspicious Prefetch Deletion for Anti-Forensics

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Suspicious Self-Deletion Batch Artifact by JadeProx TriBack Loader (via file_event)

Windows Prefetch File Deletion via .pf File Removal

Pivot detection · T1070.004 · 9 related

Changelog

v2

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-prefetch-pf-file-deletion-via-filedelete-0a1f9d29

title: Windows Prefetch File Deletion via .pf File Removal
id: 37933900-5ab2-4c93-8cb2-7673b0bf3729
status: test
description: Identifies attempts to delete Windows Prefetch files by matching target paths under :\Windows\Prefetch\ and filenames ending in .pf. Attackers may remove these artifacts to hinder forensic reconstruction of recently executed processes. The detection relies on Windows file deletion telemetry that includes the deleted target filename, and optionally filters out svchost activity associated with common prefetch housekeeping patterns.
references:
  - Internal Research
  - https://www.group-ib.com/blog/hunting-for-ttps-with-prefetch-files/
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_delete/file_delete_win_delete_prefetch.yml
author: Cedric MAURUGEON, Huntrule Team
date: 2021-09-29
modified: 2024-01-25
tags:
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1070.004
logsource:
  product: windows
  category: file_delete
detection:
  selection:
    TargetFilename|contains: :\Windows\Prefetch\
    TargetFilename|endswith: .pf
  filter_main_svchost:
    Image|endswith: :\windows\system32\svchost.exe
    User|contains:
      - AUTHORI
      - AUTORI
  condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 0a1f9d29-6465-4776-b091-7f43b26e4c89
    type: derived

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