Windows LSASS Memory Access via Process Access Flags From Suspicious Paths
Alerts on processes attempting sensitive access to lsass.exe originating from suspicious/temp directories, using granted access and source path context.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_access
- Author
- Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2021-11-27
- Updated
- 2026-09-15
ATT&CK techniques
Cred AccessRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags process access to LSASS (lsass.exe) when the access rights granted include values commonly associated with credential dumping or memory inspection. It is significant because malware and post-exploitation tools often obtain LSASS memory by opening a handle with specific permissions. The detection relies on process access telemetry that includes the target process path, the granted access mask, and the source process image path containing common suspicious directories.
Reporting behind it
- docs.microsoft.comhttps://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights
- onedrive.live.comhttps://onedrive.live.com/view.aspx?resid=D026B4699190F1E6!2843&ithint=file%2cpptx&app=PowerPoint&authkey=!AMvCRTKB_V1J5ow
- web.archive.orghttps://web.archive.org/web/20230208123920/https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html
- slideshare.nethttps://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
- web.archive.orghttps://web.archive.org/web/20230420013146/http://security-research.dyndns.org/pub/slides/FIRST2017/FIRST-2017_Tom-Ueltschi_Sysmon_FINAL_notes.pdf
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_lsass_susp_source_process.yml
Changelog
v7- v7Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-09-15
- v5Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v4Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v3Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows LSASS Memory Access via Process Access Flags From Suspicious Paths
id: 6b536338-1ae4-41b4-8f65-db7b62d9f0c7
status: test
description: This rule flags process access to LSASS (lsass.exe) when the access rights granted include values commonly associated with credential dumping or memory inspection. It is significant because malware and post-exploitation tools often obtain LSASS memory by opening a handle with specific permissions. The detection relies on process access telemetry that includes the target process path, the granted access mask, and the source process image path containing common suspicious directories.
references:
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights
- https://onedrive.live.com/view.aspx?resid=D026B4699190F1E6!2843&ithint=file%2cpptx&app=PowerPoint&authkey=!AMvCRTKB_V1J5ow
- https://web.archive.org/web/20230208123920/https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html
- https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
- https://web.archive.org/web/20230420013146/http://security-research.dyndns.org/pub/slides/FIRST2017/FIRST-2017_Tom-Ueltschi_Sysmon_FINAL_notes.pdf
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-threat-hunting/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_lsass_susp_source_process.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2021-11-27
modified: 2026-09-15
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1003.001
- attack.s0002
- detection.threat-hunting
logsource:
category: process_access
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetImage|endswith: \lsass.exe
GrantedAccess|endswith:
- "10"
- "30"
- "50"
- "70"
- "90"
- B0
- D0
- F0
- "18"
- "38"
- "58"
- "78"
- "98"
- B8
- D8
- F8
- 1A
- 3A
- 5A
- 7A
- 9A
- BA
- DA
- FA
- "0x14C2"
- FF
SourceImage|contains:
- \Temp\
- \Users\Public\
- \PerfLogs\
- \AppData\
- \Temporary
filter_optional_generic_appdata:
SourceImage|contains|all:
- :\Users\
- \AppData\Local\
SourceImage|endswith:
- \Microsoft VS Code\Code.exe
- \software_reporter_tool.exe
- \DropboxUpdate.exe
- \MBAMInstallerService.exe
- \WebexMTA.exe
- \Meetings\WebexMTAV2.exe
- \WebEx\WebexHost.exe
- \JetBrains\Toolbox\bin\jetbrains-toolbox.exe
GrantedAccess: "0x410"
filter_optional_dropbox_1:
SourceImage|contains: :\Windows\Temp\
SourceImage|endswith: .tmp\DropboxUpdate.exe
GrantedAccess:
- "0x410"
- "0x1410"
filter_optional_dropbox_2:
SourceImage|contains|all:
- :\Users\
- \AppData\Local\Temp\
SourceImage|endswith: .tmp\DropboxUpdate.exe
GrantedAccess: "0x1410"
filter_optional_dropbox_3:
SourceImage|contains:
- :\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\
- :\Program Files\Dropbox\
SourceImage|endswith: \DropboxUpdate.exe
GrantedAccess: "0x1410"
filter_optional_nextron:
SourceImage|contains:
- :\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent\
- :\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent-sc\
SourceImage|endswith:
- \thor64.exe
- \thor.exe
- \aurora-agent-64.exe
- \aurora-agent.exe
GrantedAccess:
- "0x1fffff"
- "0x1010"
- "0x101010"
filter_optional_ms_products:
SourceImage|contains|all:
- :\Users\
- \AppData\Local\Temp\
- \vs_bootstrapper_
GrantedAccess: "0x1410"
filter_optional_chrome_update:
SourceImage|contains: :\Program Files (x86)\Google\Temp\
SourceImage|endswith: .tmp\GoogleUpdate.exe
GrantedAccess:
- "0x410"
- "0x1410"
filter_optional_keybase:
SourceImage|contains: :\Users\
SourceImage|endswith: \AppData\Local\Keybase\keybase.exe
GrantedAccess: "0x1fffff"
filter_optional_avira:
SourceImage|contains: \AppData\Local\Temp\is-
SourceImage|endswith: .tmp\avira_system_speedup.tmp
GrantedAccess: "0x1410"
filter_optional_viberpc_updater:
SourceImage|contains: \AppData\Roaming\ViberPC\
SourceImage|endswith: \updater.exe
TargetImage|endswith: \winlogon.exe
GrantedAccess: "0x1fffff"
filter_optional_adobe_arm_helper:
SourceImage|contains:
- :\Program Files\Common Files\Adobe\ARM\
- :\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\Adobe\ARM\
SourceImage|endswith: \AdobeARMHelper.exe
GrantedAccess: "0x1410"
filter_optional_malwarebytes:
SourceImage|endswith: \MBAMInstallerService.exe
GrantedAccess: "0x1410"
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
- Updaters and installers are typical false positives. Apply custom filters depending on your environment
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: fa34b441-961a-42fa-a100-ecc28c886725
type: derived