Windows process access targeting verclsid.exe with Office/VBA shellcode traces

Flags broad access to verclsid.exe from Microsoft Office/VBA contexts with VBE7.DLL call traces consistent with shellcode injection.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v5

Product: windows
Category: process_access
Author: John Lambert (tech), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2017-03-04
Updated: 2026-07-31

Analysis Detection

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
- T1055Process Injection
Defense Evasion
- T1055Process Injection
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags a highly privileged process access to verclsid.exe when the call stack contains both an Office/VBA module reference (VBE7.DLL) and Microsoft Office as the source image. Attackers may use this pattern to inject shellcode into a signed or trusted target process, helping evade defenses while executing malicious code. It relies on Windows process access telemetry (granted access and target image) along with call trace fields and source image paths to correlate the injecting context.

Reporting behind it

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Windows process access targeting verclsid.exe with Office/VBA shellcode traces

Pivot detection · T1055 · 9 related

Changelog

v5
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v4
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v3
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-process-access-verclsid-exe-receiving-shellcode-injection-from-microsoft-b7967e22

title: Windows process access targeting verclsid.exe with Office/VBA shellcode traces
id: da8b33f7-38ba-4acf-ae6c-ebe34d49e85a
status: test
description: This rule flags a highly privileged process access to verclsid.exe when the call stack contains both an Office/VBA module reference (VBE7.DLL) and Microsoft Office as the source image. Attackers may use this pattern to inject shellcode into a signed or trusted target process, helping evade defenses while executing malicious code. It relies on Windows process access telemetry (granted access and target image) along with call trace fields and source image paths to correlate the injecting context.
references:
  - https://twitter.com/JohnLaTwC/status/837743453039534080
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2017/Malware/Hancitor/proc_access_win_malware_verclsid_shellcode.yml
author: John Lambert (tech), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2017-03-04
modified: 2021-11-27
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1055
  - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
  category: process_access
  product: windows
  definition: 'Requirements: The following config is required to generate the necessary Event ID 10 Process Access events: <ProcessAccess onmatch="include"><CallTrace condition="contains">VBE7.DLL</CallTrace></ProcessAccess><ProcessAccess onmatch="exclude"><CallTrace condition="excludes">UNKNOWN</CallTrace></ProcessAccess>'
detection:
  selection_target:
    TargetImage|endswith: \verclsid.exe
    GrantedAccess: "0x1FFFFF"
  selection_calltrace_1:
    CallTrace|contains|all:
      - "|UNKNOWN("
      - VBE7.DLL
  selection_calltrace_2:
    SourceImage|contains: \Microsoft Office\
    CallTrace|contains: "|UNKNOWN"
  condition: selection_target and 1 of selection_calltrace_*
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: b7967e22-3d7e-409b-9ed5-cdae3f9243a1
    type: derived

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