Windows Process Creation: Command Line Targets Microsoft Teams Cookies or LevelDB
Alerts when non-Teams processes reference Microsoft Teams Cookies or Local Storage leveldb paths in their command line.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- @SerkinValery (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2022-09-16
- Updated
- 2026-07-30
ATT&CK techniques
Cred AccessRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags Windows process creation events where the command line contains paths to Microsoft Teams Cookies or the Local Storage leveldb directory. Accessing these locations can indicate credential or session token harvesting from Teams, which may expose authentication-related data for logged-in accounts. The detection relies on process creation telemetry and command-line/path substring matching, excluding events originating from the Teams executable.
Reporting behind it
- bleepingcomputer.comhttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-teams-stores-auth-tokens-as-cleartext-in-windows-linux-macs/
- vectra.aihttps://www.vectra.ai/blogpost/undermining-microsoft-teams-security-by-mining-tokens
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_teams_suspicious_command_line_cred_access.yml
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: "Windows Process Creation: Command Line Targets Microsoft Teams Cookies or LevelDB"
id: c80818ba-d84e-40fe-a817-212921f2a3d2
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows process creation events where the command line contains paths to Microsoft Teams Cookies or the Local Storage leveldb directory. Accessing these locations can indicate credential or session token harvesting from Teams, which may expose authentication-related data for logged-in accounts. The detection relies on process creation telemetry and command-line/path substring matching, excluding events originating from the Teams executable.
references:
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/microsoft-teams-stores-auth-tokens-as-cleartext-in-windows-linux-macs/
- https://www.vectra.ai/blogpost/undermining-microsoft-teams-security-by-mining-tokens
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_teams_suspicious_command_line_cred_access.yml
author: "@SerkinValery, Huntrule Team"
date: 2022-09-16
modified: 2023-12-18
tags:
- attack.credential-access
- attack.t1528
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
detection:
selection:
CommandLine|contains:
- \Microsoft\Teams\Cookies
- \Microsoft\Teams\Local Storage\leveldb
filter_main_legit_locations:
Image|endswith: \Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: d2eb17db-1d39-41dc-b57f-301f6512fa75
type: derived