Windows process creation: CrackMapExec execution via characteristic command-line flags

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Discovery

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1053Scheduled Task/Job
Priv Esc
- T1053Scheduled Task/Job
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
- T1110Brute Force
Discovery
- T1201Password Policy Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags Windows process creation events where the executable name ends with "\crackmapexec.exe" and the command line contains characteristic flag combinations, including module usage and local-auth options. The behavior matters because CrackMapExec is often used for credential checking and remote management activities, and attackers may replace the binary while keeping the same operational flags. Detection relies on process creation telemetry with command-line arguments and the process image path.

Reporting behind it

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Windows process creation: CrackMapExec execution via characteristic command-line flags

Pivot detection · T1059.001 · 9 related

Changelog

v2

v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-process-creation-crackmapexec-execution-via-distinctive-command-line-fla-42a993dd

title: "Windows process creation: CrackMapExec execution via characteristic command-line flags"
id: bd0eca4e-dc2f-49b8-8387-d4eeaa39009b
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows process creation events where the executable name ends with "\crackmapexec.exe" and the command line contains characteristic flag combinations, including module usage and local-auth options. The behavior matters because CrackMapExec is often used for credential checking and remote management activities, and attackers may replace the binary while keeping the same operational flags. Detection relies on process creation telemetry with command-line arguments and the process image path.
references:
  - https://mpgn.gitbook.io/crackmapexec/smb-protocol/authentication/checking-credentials-local
  - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/telegram-malware-iranian-espionage
  - https://www.infosecmatter.com/crackmapexec-module-library/?cmem=mssql-mimikatz
  - https://www.infosecmatter.com/crackmapexec-module-library/?cmem=smb-pe_inject
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_crackmapexec_execution.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-02-25
modified: 2023-03-08
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.persistence
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.credential-access
  - attack.discovery
  - attack.t1047
  - attack.t1053
  - attack.t1059.003
  - attack.t1059.001
  - attack.t1110
  - attack.t1201
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_binary:
    Image|endswith: \crackmapexec.exe
  selection_special:
    CommandLine|contains: " -M pe_inject "
  selection_execute:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - " --local-auth"
      - " -u "
      - " -x "
  selection_hash:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - " --local-auth"
      - " -u "
      - " -p "
      - " -H 'NTHASH'"
  selection_module_mssql:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - " mssql "
      - " -u "
      - " -p "
      - " -M "
      - " -d "
  selection_module_smb1:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - " smb "
      - " -u "
      - " -H "
      - " -M "
      - " -o "
  selection_module_smb2:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - " smb "
      - " -u "
      - " -p "
      - " --local-auth"
  part_localauth_1:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - " --local-auth"
      - " -u "
      - " -p "
  part_localauth_2:
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - " 10."
      - " 192.168."
      - "/24 "
  condition: 1 of selection_* or all of part_localauth*
falsepositives:
  - Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 42a993dd-bb3e-48c8-b372-4d6684c4106c
    type: derived

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