Windows Process Creation: CrushFTP spawning PowerShell, CMD, and scripting tool execution
Detects CrushFTP launching PowerShell/CMD and related LOLBins with command patterns consistent with RCE exploitation behavior.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- Nisarg Suthar (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2025-08-01
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
Initial Access → Priv EscRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Persistence
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule looks for CrushFTP process executions that spawn PowerShell (including ISE/pwsh) with indicators such as IEX, enc, Hidden, and bypass, as well as cmd.exe commands containing /c powershell and reconnaissance or network enumeration strings. It also flags child processes commonly used to download or run scripts (bitsadmin, certutil, mshta, cscript, wscript) when spawned by crushftp.exe. This matters because such parent-child process relationships and command patterns can indicate attempted remote exploitation and follow-on execution. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry with parent image, child image, and command-line fields.
Reporting behind it
- reliaquest.comhttps://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-cve-2025-54309-crushftp-exploit/
- pwn.guidehttps://pwn.guide/free/web/crushftp
- firecompass.comhttps://firecompass.com/crushftp-vulnerability-cve-2025-54309-securing-file-transfer-services/
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2025/Exploits/CVE-2025-54309/proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2025_54309.yml
Changelog
v5- v5Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v4Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v3Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: "Windows Process Creation: CrushFTP spawning PowerShell, CMD, and scripting tool execution"
id: cbcc4858-562d-4600-8e78-491deb0a69e2
status: experimental
description: This rule looks for CrushFTP process executions that spawn PowerShell (including ISE/pwsh) with indicators such as IEX, enc, Hidden, and bypass, as well as cmd.exe commands containing /c powershell and reconnaissance or network enumeration strings. It also flags child processes commonly used to download or run scripts (bitsadmin, certutil, mshta, cscript, wscript) when spawned by crushftp.exe. This matters because such parent-child process relationships and command patterns can indicate attempted remote exploitation and follow-on execution. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry with parent image, child image, and command-line fields.
references:
- https://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-cve-2025-54309-crushftp-exploit/
- https://pwn.guide/free/web/crushftp
- https://firecompass.com/crushftp-vulnerability-cve-2025-54309-securing-file-transfer-services/
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2025/Exploits/CVE-2025-54309/proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2025_54309.yml
author: Nisarg Suthar, Huntrule Team
date: 2025-08-01
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.initial-access
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
- attack.t1059.003
- attack.t1068
- attack.t1190
- cve.2025-54309
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_parent:
ParentImage|endswith: \crushftp.exe
selection_child_powershell:
Image|endswith:
- \powershell.exe
- \powershell_ise.exe
- \pwsh.exe
CommandLine|contains|all:
- IEX
- enc
- Hidden
- bypass
selection_child_cmd:
Image|endswith: \cmd.exe
CommandLine|contains:
- /c powershell
- whoami
- net.exe
- net1.exe
selection_child_others:
Image|endswith:
- \bitsadmin.exe
- \certutil.exe
- \mshta.exe
- \cscript.exe
- \wscript.exe
condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_child_*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative command execution
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 0fdc7c7f-c690-4217-9ae3-31f5156eed72
type: derived