Windows Process Creation: CrushFTP spawning PowerShell, CMD, and scripting tool execution

Detects CrushFTP launching PowerShell/CMD and related LOLBins with command patterns consistent with RCE exploitation behavior.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v5
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
Nisarg Suthar (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published
2025-08-01
Updated
2026-07-31
title: "Windows Process Creation: CrushFTP spawning PowerShell, CMD, and scripting tool execution"
id: cbcc4858-562d-4600-8e78-491deb0a69e2
status: experimental
description: This rule looks for CrushFTP process executions that spawn PowerShell (including ISE/pwsh) with indicators such as IEX, enc, Hidden, and bypass, as well as cmd.exe commands containing /c powershell and reconnaissance or network enumeration strings. It also flags child processes commonly used to download or run scripts (bitsadmin, certutil, mshta, cscript, wscript) when spawned by crushftp.exe. This matters because such parent-child process relationships and command patterns can indicate attempted remote exploitation and follow-on execution. The detection relies on Windows process creation telemetry with parent image, child image, and command-line fields.
references:
  - https://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-cve-2025-54309-crushftp-exploit/
  - https://pwn.guide/free/web/crushftp
  - https://firecompass.com/crushftp-vulnerability-cve-2025-54309-securing-file-transfer-services/
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2025/Exploits/CVE-2025-54309/proc_creation_win_exploit_cve_2025_54309.yml
author: Nisarg Suthar, Huntrule Team
date: 2025-08-01
tags:
  - attack.privilege-escalation
  - attack.initial-access
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059.001
  - attack.t1059.003
  - attack.t1068
  - attack.t1190
  - cve.2025-54309
  - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_parent:
    ParentImage|endswith: \crushftp.exe
  selection_child_powershell:
    Image|endswith:
      - \powershell.exe
      - \powershell_ise.exe
      - \pwsh.exe
    CommandLine|contains|all:
      - IEX
      - enc
      - Hidden
      - bypass
  selection_child_cmd:
    Image|endswith: \cmd.exe
    CommandLine|contains:
      - /c powershell
      - whoami
      - net.exe
      - net1.exe
  selection_child_others:
    Image|endswith:
      - \bitsadmin.exe
      - \certutil.exe
      - \mshta.exe
      - \cscript.exe
      - \wscript.exe
  condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_child_*
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate administrative command execution
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: 0fdc7c7f-c690-4217-9ae3-31f5156eed72
    type: derived