Windows process creation patterns associated with DarkSide ransomware helpers
Detects Windows process creation consistent with DarkSide ransomware helper execution using encoded command-line content.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2021-05-14
- Updated
- 2026-07-31
ATT&CK techniques
ExecutionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags Windows processes where the command line matches a characteristic PowerShell-style byte/char construction and includes work/path parameters. It further constrains matches by requiring a specific parent command line referencing DllHost.exe with a fixed processid GUID and an image path under the current user’s Temp directory. This combination matters because ransomware helper behavior often executes through scripted loading and temporary staging, and the rule relies on process creation telemetry including Image, ParentCommandLine, and CommandLine.
Reporting behind it
- fireeye.comhttps://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html
- app.any.runhttps://app.any.run/tasks/8b9a571b-bcc1-4783-ba32-df4ba623b9c0/
- joesandbox.comhttps://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/411752/0/html#7048BB9A06B8F2DD9D24C77F389D7B2B58D2
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2021/Malware/DarkSide/proc_creation_win_malware_darkside_ransomware.yml
Changelog
v5- v5Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v4Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v3Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v2Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
- v1No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: Windows process creation patterns associated with DarkSide ransomware helpers
id: d8d727a0-a631-4a37-9e77-106747f2862f
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows processes where the command line matches a characteristic PowerShell-style byte/char construction and includes work/path parameters. It further constrains matches by requiring a specific parent command line referencing DllHost.exe with a fixed processid GUID and an image path under the current user’s Temp directory. This combination matters because ransomware helper behavior often executes through scripted loading and temporary staging, and the rule relies on process creation telemetry including Image, ParentCommandLine, and CommandLine.
references:
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html
- https://app.any.run/tasks/8b9a571b-bcc1-4783-ba32-df4ba623b9c0/
- https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/411752/0/html#7048BB9A06B8F2DD9D24C77F389D7B2B58D2
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2021/Malware/DarkSide/proc_creation_win_malware_darkside_ransomware.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2021-05-14
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1204
- detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection1:
CommandLine|contains:
- =[char][byte]('0x'+
- " -work worker0 -path "
selection2:
ParentCommandLine|contains: DllHost.exe /Processid:{3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7}
Image|contains: \AppData\Local\Temp\
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
- UAC bypass method used by other malware
level: critical
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 965fff6c-1d7e-4e25-91fd-cdccd75f7d2c
type: derived