Windows Process Creation: Detect Reversed PowerShell Command Tokens in CommandLine
Alerts on suspicious reversed token usage in PowerShell command lines on Windows, excluding -EncodedCommand / -enc.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Vasiliy Burov (rule), oscd.community, Tim Shelton (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2020-10-11
- Updated
- 2026-07-30
ATT&CK techniques
Execution → Defense EvasionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags Windows process creation events where PowerShell (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) is launched with CommandLine content containing specific reversed-character tokens. Reversed strings are commonly used to obscure what the script is doing and may hinder straightforward command inspection. The detection relies on process creation telemetry and the Image and CommandLine fields, while excluding cases that include common encoded-command flags to reduce false positives.
Reporting behind it
- 2019.offzone.moscowhttps://2019.offzone.moscow/ru/report/hunting-for-powershell-abuses/
- speakerdeck.comhttps://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse?slide=66
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_cmdline_reversed_strings.yml
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: "Windows Process Creation: Detect Reversed PowerShell Command Tokens in CommandLine"
id: ecb0a7db-4265-4e57-bfe6-32574348d682
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows process creation events where PowerShell (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) is launched with CommandLine content containing specific reversed-character tokens. Reversed strings are commonly used to obscure what the script is doing and may hinder straightforward command inspection. The detection relies on process creation telemetry and the Image and CommandLine fields, while excluding cases that include common encoded-command flags to reduce false positives.
references:
- https://2019.offzone.moscow/ru/report/hunting-for-powershell-abuses/
- https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse?slide=66
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_powershell_cmdline_reversed_strings.yml
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Vasiliy Burov (rule), oscd.community, Tim Shelton, Huntrule Team
date: 2020-10-11
modified: 2023-05-31
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_img:
- Image|endswith:
- \powershell.exe
- \pwsh.exe
- OriginalFileName:
- PowerShell.EXE
- pwsh.dll
selection_cli:
CommandLine|contains:
- hctac
- kaerb
- dnammoc
- ekovn
- eliFd
- rahc
- etirw
- golon
- tninon
- eddih
- tpircS
- ssecorp
- llehsrewop
- esnopser
- daolnwod
- tneilCbeW
- tneilc
- ptth
- elifotevas
- 46esab
- htaPpmeTteG
- tcejbO
- maerts
- hcaerof
- retupmoc
filter_main_encoded_keyword:
CommandLine|contains:
- " -EncodedCommand "
- " -enc "
condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: b6b49cd1-34d6-4ead-b1bf-176e9edba9a4
type: derived