Windows Process Creation: Emotet-like Command-Line Patterns

Alerts on Windows process executions with command-line indicators consistent with Emotet-like staging and encoded payload usage.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v5

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2019-09-30
Updated: 2026-07-31

Analysis Detection

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059.001PowerShell
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
- T1027Obfuscated Files or Information
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags Windows process executions whose command lines contain specific encoded and obfuscated patterns associated with Emotet-like behavior. Attackers may use these markers for stealthy scripting, staging, and execution, making command-line content a useful signal for early compromise detection. It relies on process creation telemetry, specifically the CommandLine field, and excludes events matching known benign substrings provided by the rule’s filter.

Reporting behind it

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Windows Process Creation: Emotet-like Command-Line Patterns

Pivot detection · T1027 · 9 related

Changelog

v5
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v4
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v3
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v2
Candidate ingested via manual entry.2026-07-31
v1
No changelog recorded for this version.2026-07-30

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-process-creation-emotet-like-powershell-wmi-command-line-indicators-d02e8cf5

title: "Windows Process Creation: Emotet-like Command-Line Patterns"
id: a95c7bde-9693-4c2a-b8b2-8df529fda32a
status: stable
description: This rule flags Windows process executions whose command lines contain specific encoded and obfuscated patterns associated with Emotet-like behavior. Attackers may use these markers for stealthy scripting, staging, and execution, making command-line content a useful signal for early compromise detection. It relies on process creation telemetry, specifically the CommandLine field, and excludes events matching known benign substrings provided by the rule’s filter.
references:
  - https://app.any.run/tasks/e13ab713-64cf-4b23-ad93-6dceaa5429ac/
  - https://app.any.run/tasks/81f3c28c-c686-425d-8a2b-a98198d244e1/
  - https://app.any.run/tasks/97f875e8-0e08-4328-815f-055e971ba754/
  - https://app.any.run/tasks/84fc9b4a-ea2b-47b1-8aa6-9014402dfb56/
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2019/Malware/Emotet/proc_creation_win_malware_emotet.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2019-09-30
modified: 2023-02-04
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.stealth
  - attack.t1059.001
  - attack.t1027
  - detection.emerging-threats
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - " -e* PAA"
      - JABlAG4AdgA6AHUAcwBlAHIAcAByAG8AZgBpAGwAZQ
      - QAZQBuAHYAOgB1AHMAZQByAHAAcgBvAGYAaQBsAGUA
      - kAGUAbgB2ADoAdQBzAGUAcgBwAHIAbwBmAGkAbABlA
      - IgAoACcAKgAnACkAOwAkA
      - IAKAAnACoAJwApADsAJA
      - iACgAJwAqACcAKQA7ACQA
      - JABGAGwAeAByAGgAYwBmAGQ
      - PQAkAGUAbgB2ADoAdABlAG0AcAArACgA
      - 0AJABlAG4AdgA6AHQAZQBtAHAAKwAoA
      - 9ACQAZQBuAHYAOgB0AGUAbQBwACsAKA
  filter:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - fAAgAEMAbwBuAHYAZQByAHQAVABvAC0ASgBzAG8AbgAgAC0ARQByAHIAbwByAEEAYwB0AGkAbwBuACAAUwBpAGwAZQBuAHQAbAB5AEMAbwBuAHQAaQBuAHUAZQ
      - wAIABDAG8AbgB2AGUAcgB0AFQAbwAtAEoAcwBvAG4AIAAtAEUAcgByAG8AcgBBAGMAdABpAG8AbgAgAFMAaQBsAGUAbgB0AGwAeQBDAG8AbgB0AGkAbgB1AGUA
      - 8ACAAQwBvAG4AdgBlAHIAdABUAG8ALQBKAHMAbwBuACAALQBFAHIAcgBvAHIAQQBjAHQAaQBvAG4AIABTAGkAbABlAG4AdABsAHkAQwBvAG4AdABpAG4AdQBlA
  condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
  - Unlikely
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: d02e8cf5-6099-48cf-9bfc-1eec2d0c7b18
    type: derived

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