Windows process creation: flag suspicious program names and PowerShell script indicators
Alerts on suspicious Windows process image names and PowerShell command-line script/tool patterns commonly used in malicious tooling.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2022-02-11
- Updated
- 2026-07-30
ATT&CK techniques
ExecutionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags Windows process creation events where the process image path contains known exploit/CVE-like strings, specific hacktool-style executable name suffixes (e.g., poc.exe, artifact*.exe, meterpreter), or suspicious script/tool names in the command line. It matters because attackers frequently use recognizable, reusable filenames and PowerShell script names to stage payloads, run post-exploitation, and execute tool-based tradecraft. The detection relies on process creation telemetry, specifically the Image and CommandLine fields.
Reporting behind it
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: "Windows process creation: flag suspicious program names and PowerShell script indicators"
id: 09aae642-9146-4f29-8abe-c8d30cd16a4b
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows process creation events where the process image path contains known exploit/CVE-like strings, specific hacktool-style executable name suffixes (e.g., poc.exe, artifact*.exe, meterpreter), or suspicious script/tool names in the command line. It matters because attackers frequently use recognizable, reusable filenames and PowerShell script names to stage payloads, run post-exploitation, and execute tool-based tradecraft. The detection relies on process creation telemetry, specifically the Image and CommandLine fields.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_progname.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-02-11
modified: 2023-03-22
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_image:
- Image|contains:
- \CVE-202
- \CVE202
- Image|endswith:
- \poc.exe
- \artifact.exe
- \artifact64.exe
- \artifact_protected.exe
- \artifact32.exe
- \artifact32big.exe
- obfuscated.exe
- obfusc.exe
- \meterpreter
selection_commandline:
CommandLine|contains:
- inject.ps1
- Invoke-CVE
- pupy.ps1
- payload.ps1
- beacon.ps1
- PowerView.ps1
- bypass.ps1
- obfuscated.ps1
- obfusc.ps1
- obfus.ps1
- obfs.ps1
- evil.ps1
- MiniDogz.ps1
- _enc.ps1
- \shell.ps1
- \rshell.ps1
- revshell.ps1
- \av.ps1
- \av_test.ps1
- adrecon.ps1
- mimikatz.ps1
- \PowerUp_
- powerup.ps1
- \Temp\a.ps1
- \Temp\p.ps1
- \Temp\1.ps1
- Hound.ps1
- encode.ps1
- powercat.ps1
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate tools that accidentally match on the searched patterns
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: efdd8dd5-cee8-4e59-9390-7d4d5e4dd6f6
type: derived