Windows process creation: flag suspicious program names and PowerShell script indicators

Alerts on suspicious Windows process image names and PowerShell command-line script/tool patterns commonly used in malicious tooling.

FreeReviewedSigma · High · v1

Product: windows
Category: process_creation
Author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
Published: 2022-02-11
Updated: 2026-07-30

Analysis Detection

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule flags Windows process creation events where the process image path contains known exploit/CVE-like strings, specific hacktool-style executable name suffixes (e.g., poc.exe, artifact*.exe, meterpreter), or suspicious script/tool names in the command line. It matters because attackers frequently use recognizable, reusable filenames and PowerShell script names to stage payloads, run post-exploitation, and execute tool-based tradecraft. The detection relies on process creation telemetry, specifically the Image and CommandLine fields.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1059 — drag to rearrange

Malicious Web Server Process Spawning Command Interpreter via Web Shell (via process_creation)

Suspicious VMware Guest Operation Output Staging in vmware-system Temp Directory (via file_event)

Malicious Command Shell Spawned by SQL Server via Process Creation (via process_creation)

Suspicious Script Interpreter Spawned by Excel via DarkGate Lure

Suspicious AutoHotkey Script Execution from User Writable Path by DarkGate

Malicious China Chopper Web Shell Command Pattern in IIS Worker Process (via process_creation)

Malicious AutoHotKey Runner AutoNotify Executing AHKBot Looper Script (via process_creation)

Malicious IIS Worker Process Spawning Command Shell after ASP.NET ViewState Injection (via process_creation)

Suspicious MSSQL xp_cmdshell Enablement via sp_configure (via process_creation)

Windows process creation: flag suspicious program names and PowerShell script indicators

Pivot detection · T1059 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

windows-process-creation-flag-suspicious-program-names-and-powershell-script-ind-efdd8dd5

title: "Windows process creation: flag suspicious program names and PowerShell script indicators"
id: 09aae642-9146-4f29-8abe-c8d30cd16a4b
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows process creation events where the process image path contains known exploit/CVE-like strings, specific hacktool-style executable name suffixes (e.g., poc.exe, artifact*.exe, meterpreter), or suspicious script/tool names in the command line. It matters because attackers frequently use recognizable, reusable filenames and PowerShell script names to stage payloads, run post-exploitation, and execute tool-based tradecraft. The detection relies on process creation telemetry, specifically the Image and CommandLine fields.
references:
  - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md
  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_progname.yml
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-02-11
modified: 2023-03-22
tags:
  - attack.execution
  - attack.t1059
logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows
detection:
  selection_image:
    - Image|contains:
        - \CVE-202
        - \CVE202
    - Image|endswith:
        - \poc.exe
        - \artifact.exe
        - \artifact64.exe
        - \artifact_protected.exe
        - \artifact32.exe
        - \artifact32big.exe
        - obfuscated.exe
        - obfusc.exe
        - \meterpreter
  selection_commandline:
    CommandLine|contains:
      - inject.ps1
      - Invoke-CVE
      - pupy.ps1
      - payload.ps1
      - beacon.ps1
      - PowerView.ps1
      - bypass.ps1
      - obfuscated.ps1
      - obfusc.ps1
      - obfus.ps1
      - obfs.ps1
      - evil.ps1
      - MiniDogz.ps1
      - _enc.ps1
      - \shell.ps1
      - \rshell.ps1
      - revshell.ps1
      - \av.ps1
      - \av_test.ps1
      - adrecon.ps1
      - mimikatz.ps1
      - \PowerUp_
      - powerup.ps1
      - \Temp\a.ps1
      - \Temp\p.ps1
      - \Temp\1.ps1
      - Hound.ps1
      - encode.ps1
      - powercat.ps1
  condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
  - Legitimate tools that accidentally match on the searched patterns
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
  - id: efdd8dd5-cee8-4e59-9390-7d4d5e4dd6f6
    type: derived

Convert

This rule as a query you can run. Uses no unlock credit.

SplunkSPL