Windows Process Creation: Renamed Mavinject32/64.EXE Execution
Alerts on renamed executions of mavinject32.exe/mavinject64.exe based on OriginalFileName and image path.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- frack113, Florian Roth (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2022-12-05
- Updated
- 2026-07-30
ATT&CK techniques
Priv Esc → Defense EvasionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags process execution where the binary’s OriginalFileName matches mavinject32.exe or mavinject64.exe, excluding cases where the image path ends with the original filename. Attackers can use renamed legitimate utilities to help carry out stealthy process injection workflows, especially when invoking functionality through specific command-line flags. The rule relies on Windows process creation telemetry fields for OriginalFileName and Image path.
Reporting behind it
- github.comhttps://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218/T1218.md
- github.comhttps://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1056.004/T1056.004.md
- posts.specterops.iohttps://posts.specterops.io/mavinject-exe-functionality-deconstructed-c29ab2cf5c0e
- twitter.comhttps://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/941315826107510784
- reaqta.comhttps://reaqta.com/2017/12/mavinject-microsoft-injector/
- twitter.comhttps://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/776122138063409152
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/3742
- github.comhttps://github.com/keyboardcrunch/SentinelOne-ATTACK-Queries/blob/6a228d23eefe963ca81f2d52f94b815f61ef5ee0/Tactics/DefenseEvasion.md#t1055-process-injection
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_mavinject.yml
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: "Windows Process Creation: Renamed Mavinject32/64.EXE Execution"
id: 2664c824-10e4-4a83-bd53-77cb3dfe9e63
status: test
description: This rule flags process execution where the binary’s OriginalFileName matches mavinject32.exe or mavinject64.exe, excluding cases where the image path ends with the original filename. Attackers can use renamed legitimate utilities to help carry out stealthy process injection workflows, especially when invoking functionality through specific command-line flags. The rule relies on Windows process creation telemetry fields for OriginalFileName and Image path.
references:
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218/T1218.md
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1056.004/T1056.004.md
- https://posts.specterops.io/mavinject-exe-functionality-deconstructed-c29ab2cf5c0e
- https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/941315826107510784
- https://reaqta.com/2017/12/mavinject-microsoft-injector/
- https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/776122138063409152
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/3742
- https://github.com/keyboardcrunch/SentinelOne-ATTACK-Queries/blob/6a228d23eefe963ca81f2d52f94b815f61ef5ee0/Tactics/DefenseEvasion.md#t1055-process-injection
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_mavinject.yml
author: frack113, Florian Roth, Huntrule Team
date: 2022-12-05
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
- attack.privilege-escalation
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1055.001
- attack.t1218.013
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
OriginalFileName:
- mavinject32.exe
- mavinject64.exe
filter:
Image|endswith:
- \mavinject32.exe
- \mavinject64.exe
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: e6474a1b-5390-49cd-ab41-8d88655f7394
type: derived