Windows Process Creation: Renamed Plink (plink.exe) with SSH Port Forwarding Flags
Alerts on renamed Plink executions using SSH port forwarding flags in Windows process creation logs.
- Product
- windows
- Category
- process_creation
- Author
- Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) (SigmaHQ), DRL 1.1
- Published
- 2022-06-06
- Updated
- 2026-07-30
ATT&CK techniques
Defense EvasionRecon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact
What it detects
This rule flags Windows process executions where the process has OriginalFileName set to Plink and the command line includes SSH port forwarding-related arguments (-l forward, -P, and -R). Renamed binaries can help attackers evade simple allow/block lists while using the same underlying tool functionality. Detection relies on process creation telemetry with OriginalFileName and full command-line content, and it excludes events where the image ends with the standard plink.exe path suffix.
Reporting behind it
- thedfirreport.comhttps://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/06/will-the-real-msiexec-please-stand-up-exploit-leads-to-data-exfiltration/
- the.earth.lihttps://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/0.58/htmldoc/Chapter7.html
- github.comhttps://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_plink.yml
Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.
title: "Windows Process Creation: Renamed Plink (plink.exe) with SSH Port Forwarding Flags"
id: 933e8371-ab28-43e0-b512-2a0d3aef0991
status: test
description: This rule flags Windows process executions where the process has OriginalFileName set to Plink and the command line includes SSH port forwarding-related arguments (-l forward, -P, and -R). Renamed binaries can help attackers evade simple allow/block lists while using the same underlying tool functionality. Detection relies on process creation telemetry with OriginalFileName and full command-line content, and it excludes events where the image ends with the standard plink.exe path suffix.
references:
- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/06/06/will-the-real-msiexec-please-stand-up-exploit-leads-to-data-exfiltration/
- https://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/0.58/htmldoc/Chapter7.html
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_plink.yml
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Huntrule Team
date: 2022-06-06
modified: 2023-02-03
tags:
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1036
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection:
- OriginalFileName: Plink
- CommandLine|contains|all:
- " -l forward"
- " -P "
- " -R "
filter:
Image|endswith: \plink.exe
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
license: DRL-1.1
related:
- id: 1c12727d-02bf-45ff-a9f3-d49806a3cf43
type: derived